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ABSTRACT
The period between 1902–12 reveals a number of insights into both Italy’s
imperial history and Egypt’s colonial experience. Facing an economic crisis at
home, hundreds of thousands of Italians emigrated to expatriate communities
throughout the world, including Egypt. This massive hemorrhage of Italy’s
population led the government to embrace emigration, and new policies enacted
by the Italian foreign ministry after Italy’s military failures in Somalia and
Eritrea recast migrant Italians as “colonists” and global Italian communities as
“colonies.”
Egypt posed a particularly difficult problem for the foreign
ministry—because of the multi-ethnic character of the Egyptian social system,
established by Mohammed Ali and his khedival successors, Europeans benefitted
from a number of legal and economic advantages while simultaneously
integrating into cosmopolitan Egyptian society as mutamassirun. Emigrant
assimilation threatened to destroy Italy’s global emigrant colonial model and
consequently funded various programs and associations to reinforce notions of
italianità.
At one level, the bureaucrats and officials in the Cairene and Alexandrian
Italian consulates were concerned with the identity of the Italian communities
in Egypt, but their strategy was not limited simply to the Italianization of the
wayward mutamassirun. Egypt, given its geographic and cultural proximity to
the neighboring provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, represented a strategic
backdoor for Italy’s program of cultural and economic pénétration pacifique into
the Mediterranean Basin prior to their military invasion of Libya. Italy sought to
manufacture consent for its impending invasion and direct colonization of Libya
and engaged in campaigns of propaganda to convince both the Italian community
and the Arabic-speaking world that Italy, as a benevolent European nation, was
morally justified in colonizing Libya.
This thesis uses the archives of the Italian foreign ministry to examine
the nature of Italy’s campaign to manufacture consent and to ascertain its
effectiveness in convincing the Italian mutamassirun and the Egyptian public of
its supposedly benign imperial ambitions, and concludes that despite its attempts
at promoting Italian imperial benevolence, Italy’s hidden colonial ambitions were
obvious to the Egyptians and disbelieved by many in the Italian community.
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Chapter 1
Community or Colony?
The nascent Italian kingdom, only nominally unified in 1861, desperately sought
to compete as a colonial power as stronger European nations pursued aggressive
imperial policies in Africa, Asia, and the Mediterranean. Italy, a late “second
comer”1 in the great imperial game dominated by Britain and France, fell behind
in the quest for direct control of Mediterranean lands, losing the opportunity
to colonize North Africa, Egypt, and the Levant to French and British imperial
armies. Rather than establish colonies of direct control, in the late 1800s the
Italian government adopted an alternative form of imperialism—the policy of
emigrant colonialism, or placing “[Italian] culture and tradition in the service
of economics and politics.”2 Italy sought to recreate the cultural and economic
prestige of the ancient Roman Empire by establishing a worldwide network of
spontaneous “colonies” of expatriate emigrant Italians who remained connected
to the homeland by maintaining their italianità, or their sense of Italian identity.
Italy hoped to create a global emigrant “nation” of patriotic Italian citizens.
1. Daniel J. Grange, L’Italie et la Méditerranée (1896–1911): Les fondements d’une
politique étrangère, 2 vols. (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1994), II:1523.
2. Mark I. Choate, Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2008), 220.
Under the new policies of emigrant colonialism, the Italian expatriate
population in Egypt boomed: between 1882 and 1917 the Italian population
in Egypt more than doubled.3 As the Italian consulates, cultural centers, and
printing presses in Cairo and Alexandria began to stress and protect the italianità
of the new waves of emigrants, the Italian community in Egypt represented a
challenge for the policy of emigrant colonialism. Faced with economic benefits
in Egypt, thousands of generally poorer migrants became semi-integrated
into Egyptian society and its flourishing colonial economy. These migrants
were known as the mutamassirun, “people of foreign origin who had become
permanent residents and had been ‘Egyptianized.’”4 In 1905 the Italian consul
in Cairo complained that over a fourth of the Italian community were Italian
in name only and had no connection to the homeland—many had lost their
italianità despite government efforts to prevent integration into Egyptian
society.5 Assimilation into the cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic Egyptian culture
threatened the basic premise of emigrant colonialism—Italian economic and
political power would only spread and increase if Italian emigrants remained
loyal to the homeland. If italianità was forsaken, Italy would suffer colonial losses.
Italy’s imperial agenda in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was
not limited to emigrant colonialism. In the 1890s, driven by the desire to have
3. Davide Amicucci, “La comunità italiana in Egitto attraverso i censimenti dal 1882 al
1947,” in Tradizione e modernizzazione in Egitto: 1798-1998, ed. Paolo Branca, Collana storica
del Centro studi per i popoli extraeuropei dell’Università di Pavia, no. 16 (Milan: F. Angeli, 2000),
82.
4. Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism,
Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954 (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press,
1988), 9.
5. Marta Petricioli, Oltre il mito: L’Egitto degli italiani (1917-1947) (Torino: Mondadori
Bruno, 2007), 1.
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a strong foothold in the Red Sea, Italy invaded Abyssinia and established
colonies of direct military control in Addis Ababa, Eritrea, and elsewhere. Native
insurgents, however, successfully resisted the Italian military, and after the
violent Battle of Adwa in Ethiopia in 1896, where over 7,000 Italian soldiers
were killed, the Italian parliament lost interest in direct foreign colonies and
began to emphasize the growth and support of expatriate colonies. A little
over a decade later, in 1911, Italy decided once again to try its hand at direct
colonial intervention and launched a massive invasion of the Ottoman provinces
of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, or modern-day Libya.
The Italian invasion of Libya represents a watershed event in the
history of the expatriate Italian community in Egypt which tested the limits
of both emigrant colonialism and Italian diplomatic strategy. Egypt, because
of its proximity to Libya, became a focal point in Italy’s strategy for Libyan
colonization. During the years leading up to the actual military invasion of
1911, Italy undertook a strategy of “peaceful penetration”6 into Libya, with a
series of programs for economic development and cultural propaganda which
sought to prove Italy’s reputation as a benevolent European power that was
free from imperial ambitions. Because of Egypt’s reputation throughout the
Arabic-speaking world as a political and cultural center, Italy was able to launch
both its economic and its cultural campaigns from Cairo. The Italian foreign
ministry hoped to manufacture Arab and Egyptian consensus for the eventual
Italian endeavor in Libya through these campaigns of propaganda and economic
development.
6. Grange, II:1392.
3
Italy’s strategy of peaceful penetration was not aimed solely at building
consent among the Arabic-speaking population of the region. Driven by fears of
emigrant assimilation into Egyptian society—integration which fundamentally
threatened emigrant colonialism—the Italian government pursued similar
campaigns of propaganda to manufacture consent for the invasion among the
Italian mutamassirun. The foreign ministry hoped to strengthen the Italian
community’s ties to Italy and reinforce the notions of italianità. The government
understood that the invasion of Libya would pose a crisis for mutamassirun
sympathetic to the Libyans. Would the Italians in Egypt support the Italian
government or the Libyan resistance? How would they react to the invasion?
Would they sympathize with their Libyan neighbors, or did the years of exposure
to the myriad of cultural programs of Italianization succeed in garnering support
for such a direct colonial enterprise?
Until recently, existing literature regarding the history of the various
mutamassir communities in Egypt during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries has been sparse at best. Since the opening of consular court archives
in Cairo, a growing body of social history has arisen and has used these court
records to better understand the relationship of the mutamassir communities
to the native Egyptians in Cairo and Alexandria.7 However, no study has yet
analyzed at the relationship between European expatriate communities in Egypt
and their respective “homelands.” This thesis aims to better understand the
7. Some recent unpublished works include Mario M. Ruiz, “Intimate Disputes, Illicit
Violence: Gender, Law, and the State in Colonial Egypt, 1849-1923” (PhD diss., University of
Michigan, 2004); and Will Hanley, “Foreignness and Localness in Alexandria, 1880-1914” (PhD
diss., Princeton, 2007).
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relationship between Italy, the Italian mutamassirun, and the khedival throne
and its British backers by analyzing the Italian foreign ministry’s preparations
for the invasion of Libya and its subsequent dual-purposed campaign of economic
and cultural propaganda. The archives of the Italian embassy in Cairo, housed at
the foreign ministry in Rome, are rich and rather unexplored in both American
and Italian scholarship. This thesis makes extensive use of these consular
archives, primarily the hundreds of pages of typed correspondence between
Cairo, Alexandria, and Rome. By analyzing official government documents I
intend on revealing the attitude of the Italian government towards both the
mutamassir community in Egypt as well as the Egyptian government. While
such an approach is not strictly social history, this analysis will add to the
growing body of scholarship on cosmopolitan Egypt in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, challenging longstanding notions of British imperial primacy
in Egypt as well as dispelling and adding nuance to the “myth” of mutamassir
acquiescence and dependence on their home nations.
After establishing the importance of emigration and expatriate colonists
in Italian foreign policy, the history and scope of Italian colonization and
imperial domination, and the role of Egypt in Italy’s Libyan goals, the thesis
will examine Italy’s actions towards both its mutamassir emigrant colonies as
well as the general Egyptian population, focusing primarily on the period from
1903–1912—the heyday of Italian intervention in Egypt. Chapter 2, “Italianità
vs. Mutamassiriyya,” reviews the existing literature on mutamassir identity and
its place in Egyptian and Middle Eastern historiography. It sets the groundwork
for this thesis’s goal, which is to recount the history of the Italian mutamassir
5
community by looking at the dual mission of the Italian ministry of foreign
affairs within Egypt during the decade preceding the imperial invasion of Libya:
strengthening the italianità of the emigrant Italian colony and building Italian
prestige in the Egyptian and Arab world. Chapter 3, “Colonia in Colonia,” looks
at one of the main obstacles Italy faced as it worked to manufacture consent and
spread propaganda among its colony and the Egyptians. Because Egypt was a
British protectorate, Italy, as a lesser European power, was forced to operate
within the British colonial order, often to the detriment of Italy’s foreign policy.
Chapter 4, “Italy and the Press,” addresses one of the principal battlegrounds
for the two-pronged Italian campaign to build and maintain Italian prestige and
prepare for the invasion of Libya. Finally, chapter 5, “Manufactured consent?,”
examines the efficacy of the Italian press campaign, as well as philo-Islamic
propaganda efforts, and analyzes the reaction of both the Italian community
and the Egyptian public to Italy’s subtle campaign of pénétration pacifique. In
the end, this thesis will prove the Italian foreign ministry largely unsuccessful
in winning over either the Egyptians or the Italian mutamassirun despite its
attempts to manufacture consent for the war among both communities. Although
it tried to build up its image as a culturally and morally benevolent European
center—disinterested in the economic subjugation of Egypt and the rest of the
region—the underlying imperialist veneer of its professed benevolence was
incontrovertibly clear.
6
Emigrant colonialism
During the 1870s and 80s, the major European powers competed in the
“scramble for Africa” in an attempt to secure lands rich in resources and situated
in geographically strategic locations. Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and
other countries vied for the same Mediterranean and African territories, at
times waging diplomatic battles over rights of territorial exploitation. In 1878
diplomats from the leading powers met together in Germany as part of the
Berlin Congress in an effort to divide up the African continent and avoid future
complications and territorial disputes. Italy’s delegation, headed by Prime
Minister Benedetto Cairoli, surprisingly refused to lay claims on any African
territory, for he held that “each nation in Europe, and across the world, had the
right to self-determination.”8 Cairoli’s idealistic “clean hands” policy caused
Italy a major setback in the ensuing land grab. France, which did not hold
the same romantic ideals, invaded and occupied Tunisia in 1881, barely 100
miles from Italian Sicily. Cairoli was promptly ousted from the government and
the succeeding prime minister, Agostino Depretis, and his foreign minister,
Pasquale Mancini, formally launched Italy’s African imperialist agenda.9 Mancini
believed that the source of future Italian imperial power lay in controlling the
Mediterranean, and that the key to the Mediterranean was the Red Sea, since it
fed into the Mediterranean through the newly opened Suez Canal. In December
8. Choate, 30.
9. Ibid., 30.
7
1881 Italy claimed the Ottoman port of Assab in Eritrea, and over the next eight
years sought to take control of the rest of the Horn of Africa, including Somalia
and Eritrea.10 Italy was so focused on its military endeavors in the Horn that it
refused to participate in other colonial invasions; in 1882 Britain invited Italy to
assist in the British anti-nationalist expedition against General Ahmed ʿUrabi in
Egypt, but Italy declined, despite the sizable Italian communities in Egypt.11
While pursuing its newly formed imperial agenda, Italy was forced to deal
with a severe crisis domestically. The Italian economy faced deep stagnation and
lagged behind its French and German neighbors, whose economies were thriving.
Italian workers, encouraged by growing industrialized markets in Europe and
across the Atlantic in North and South America, began to leave Italy by the
millions. Between 1880 and 1915 thirteen million Italians left their homeland in
search of better economic opportunity.12 Italian politicians scrambled to stop
or slow this hemorrhaging of the population, but because migrants were able
to double or triple their wages abroad,13 the government was unsuccessful
in curbing the rising rates of migration. In 1887, however, Prime Minister
Francesco Crispi, successor to the East African imperialist Depretis, proposed a
solution to Italy’s unchecked emigration—direct settler colonialism. By opening
up new markets in Somalia and Eritrea, Crispi hoped to institute East African
colonies that could “accommodate that immense emigration which goes to
10. Choate, 30–31.
11. Ibid., 30.
12. Ibid., 1.
13. Ibid., 3.
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foreign lands, placing this emigration under the dominion and laws of Italy.”14
Crispi felt that by using East Africa as an escape valve to redirect American
and European emigration, Italy would be able to take its place among the other
European world powers, unhindered by economic recession at home.
Despite Crispi’s intentions, Italy’s military ventures in the Horn of Africa
were disastrous. East Africa already had a large indigenous population—it
was hardly an empty land, ripe for Italy’s colonial exploitation. The Ethiopian
resistance was stronger and better equipped than the Italian military had
originally planned, and skirmishes between the two sides were fierce. On January
26, 1887, Ethiopian forces near the Eritrean town of Dogali ambushed an Italian
battalion and killed 422 soldiers.15 Less than a decade later, on February 29,
1896, the Italians suffered the worst military defeat of a European military
in the history of European imperialism in Africa. Ethiopian forces, under the
command of King Menelik and supplied with long-range machine guns by France
and Russia, decimated three columns of Italian troops near the Ethiopian town
of Adwa; 7,000 Italian and Eritrean soldiers were killed, 1,500 wounded, and
nearly 2,000 captured, while the Ethiopians lost anywhere from three to twelve
thousand soldiers.16 While the 1887 Dogali massacre was commemorated
throughout Italy, and even led to the erection of a memorial obelisk in Piazza dei
Cinquecento, or Square of the Five Hundred, in Rome, the bloody defeat at Adwa
“could not be commemorated for shame” and Crispi resigned in humiliation.17
14. Mar. 6, 1915, in Discorsi parlamentari di Francesco Crispi, 3 vols. (Rome: Tipografia
della Camera dei Deputati, 1915), III:469; cited in Choate, 7.
15. Choate, 21.
16. Ibid., 37.
17. Ibid., 38.
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The bloody rout at Adwa forced a reexamination of Italian imperial
strategy. In 1899, Luigi Einaudi, a young economics professor from Torino
published a groundbreaking monograph entitled The Merchant Prince in which
he proposed that Italy’s imperial strength lied not in military victories, but
in economic might. He argued that Italian trade did not “follow the flag” of
militant colonialism, as traditional notions of European imperialist economics
held, but that, instead, trade followed emigration.18 Einaudi’s theory of the
Italian merchant prince held that Italy’s emigrants could be transformed into
a cohesive expatriate “nation” that would spread Italian economic prowess
abroad—if emigrants throughout the world “loved Italy and spoke Italian, Italy’s
exports and political influence would grow.”19 Emigrants were no longer cast
as near-traitors who had betrayed their homeland in pursuit of wealth; they
were often compared to the medieval poet Dante Alighieri, who was exiled from
Florence in the thirteenth century, or even the Roman poet Virgil, also exiled
from Italian Mantua.20
In 1901, on the heels of Einaudi’s theory, the Italian parliament passed an
emigration law that shifted responsibility for Italian emigrants from the interior
ministry to the foreign ministry, thus “marking emigration as an international
expansion instead of an internal hemorrhage.”21 The rhetoric of the government
reflected this shift in the definition of imperialism—colonia was used to describe
both the Italian colonies in East Africa as well as colonies in Argentina, Egypt,
18. Choate, 51.
19. Ibid., 41.
20. Ibid., 6.
21. Ibid., 59.
10
Tunisia, and all other Italian expatriate communities—the proceedings of the
Istituto Coloniale Italiano (Italian Colonial Institute, or ICI) made little distinction
between the actual old-style imperial colony in Eritrea and the fledgling Italian
communities in Syria; both were colonie.22 Every Italian migrant worldwide thus
became an Italian colonist and every expatriate Italian enclave a colony. While
other European powers, such as Britain and France, built up their global empires
with actual land grabs and military invasions, Italy attempted to use economics
and culture to create an international expatriate empire.
The risk of emigrant colonialism: identity
While the policy of emigrant colonialism enabled Italy to spread its economic
and cultural influence throughout the world, from North and South America to
Tunisia, Tripolitania, and Egypt, the idea of sending Italians to live and work
in foreign societies and economies presented a difficult problem: assimilation.
Migrants, far from the Italian homeland, often adopted the culture and language
of their host countries, forsaking their italianità, or Italianness, as they became
integrated into their new countries. Because Italian foreign and economic
policy hinged on remittances from Italian emigrants and the strengthening
of international Italian commercial prestige, the loss of italianità threatened
to destroy the strategy of emigrant colonialism—without strong ties to Italy,
the global network of Italians would collapse. Driven by concerns of emigrant
22. The tables of contents for the proceedings of both the 1906 and the 1911 ICI
congresses labelled both types of colonies simply as “colonies” , Atti del secondo congresso degli
italiani all’estero, Istituto coloniale italiano (n. p., 1911).
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assimilation, the Italian government instituted and subsidized a number of
programs, organizations, and publications to reinforce the notion of italianità.
In 1913, the leading Italian newspaper in Argentina, La Patria degli
italiani, published what would become an almost canonical set of instructions
for all Italian emigrants worldwide. This decalogue, entitled “The New Ten
Commandments of Italian Emigrants,” was circulated throughout the global
Italian community and reflects the Italian government’s fears of emigrant
assimilation:
1. There is only one Fatherland, and your Fatherland is Italy. You shall
love no other country as much as Italy.
2. You shall never name your fatherland without reverence. Exalt the
glories of your Italy, which is one of the most ancient and noble
nations in the world.
3. Remember the national holidays, wherever you might be. On these
occasions, at least, forget your political party and religious faith;
remember only that you are Italian.
4. Honor the official representative [consul] of your fatherland, and
respect him as a symbol of the faraway fatherland, even if sometimes
he displeases you.
5. You shall not kill a citizen of the Fatherland by erasing in yourself the
Italian consciousness, feeling, and citizenship. You shall not disguise
your name and surname with a barbaric transcription.
6. You shall not attack out of envy the authority and prestige of your
compatriots who hold honorary appointments.
7. You shall not steal citizens from your fatherland, letting your children
squander their italianità to become absorbed by the people among
whom you have emigrated.
8. Be proud to declare yourself always, everywhere and on every
occasion, Italian in origin and in sentiment, and be not servile, be not
despised by those who host you.
9. You shall always buy and sell, consume and distribute goods and
merchandise from your fatherland.
10. You shall marry only an Italian woman. Only with this and by this
woman shall you be able to preserve in your children the blood,
language, and feelings of your fathers and of your Italy.23
23. Choate, 73.
12
The parallels between this modern emigrant’s decalogue and the original
biblical ten commandments that the Catholic Italians were already intimately
familiar with are fascinating and reveal the deep concern the Italian government
had regarding the massive amounts of emigrants leaving the country. Each
emigrant commandment clearly corresponds with its biblical counterpart: thou
shalt have no other gods before God, or fatherlands before Italy; remember the
sabbath—and national holidays—to keep them holy; honor thy father and thy
mother, and thy local consular officer; thou shalt not kill… thy Italian identity,
for assimilation is a form of murder; thou shalt not covet your neighbor’s wife
or thy neighbor’s commercial goods. Although these concerns were formally
presented as a decalogue in 1913, the risks inherent in assimilation among
the various melting-pot host societies were an issue from the beginning of the
emigrant colonialism experiment. In order to mitigate those risks, the Italian
government pursued various strategies to retain emigrant culture worldwide. The
main policy used to create and maintain italianità abroad was the promotion of
the Italian language, for, as Italian scholars and politicians believed, “if [Italian
migrants] spoke the “language of Dante,” they would be moored to Italian
culture and society no matter where they lived.”24 Organizations like the Società
Dante Alighieri (SDA), Italica Gens, and the previously mentioned ICI allowed
the government to remain engaged with its global communities and promote
italianità throughout their indirect colonial holdings. SDA, a liberal organization
with masonic and governmental funding, became the center of a wide range of
emigrant cultural activities. The Society promoted emigrant literacy by providing
24. Choate, 101.
13
free libraries of Italian literature and reference books. It established local mutual
aid committees and societies that assisted emigrants with self-improvement and
provided social assistance. Additionally, it founded free Italian-language schools
and literary societies, as well as competitive community sports clubs.25 The
actions of the SDA allowed the various Italian communities to remain involved in
their host communities to a certain degree while remaining closely connected to
the Italian homeland—these activities “gave the Italian expatriate colonies pride
in themselves and earned respect from outsiders.”26
Similarly, the Catholic Church also sought to build up italianità among
the large Italian expatriate population. Catholic monks and missionaries,
supported by funding from the Italica Gens organization, were sent out among
the various emigrant colonies in order to “counsel the Italian emigrants to avoid
the dangers of crowding in big [anticlerical] cities, guiding them into compact
and homogeneous colonies… [where] they can preserve the ancestral faith,
and the national language and character.”27 Like SDA, Italica Gens focused on
language as its primary mission. It built dozens of heavily subsidized religious
schools run by volunteer priests and nuns. Beyond simply teaching the Italian
language, the schools built by Italica Gens pursued a blatantly nationalist agenda,
instilling, and even forcing, patriotism in their pupils in the name of italianità.
The organization at times even went as far as to urge priests to “withhold the
sacraments from parents who did not send their children to Italian schools.”28
25. Choate, 105, 109.
26. Ibid., 109.
27. Ibid., 141.
28. Ibid., 142–143.
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Italica Gens and SDA were crucially important for maintaining both
italianità and the overall policy of emigrant colonialism. If emigrants lost their
connection to the homeland, remittances would cease and Italian economic
influence abroad would wane as Italian emigrant culture became swallowed
up in the various host cultures. The efforts of these organizations focused both
on the middle class, who were more likely to form athletic clubs and literary
circles, and on the lower class of laborers, who needed subsidized or free Italian
education. The efficacy of these programs of Italianization varied along class
lines: in the more well-off Italian colonies, members of the emigrant middle class
often rallied together to form the base of local SDA leadership, while in colonies
that merely provided migrants with manual labor the working class was at high
risk of forgetting their italianità, for amidst their heavy labor, which often took
place alongside indigenous workers, “the memory of Italian culture and traditions
could quickly dim.”29 Nonetheless, both organizations, along with the dozens of
other independent societies and committees throughout the Italian diaspora, held
tremendous influence over italianità and were largely successful in protecting
Italian identity abroad and promoting Italian commercial prestige during the first
decades of the experiment in emigrant colonialism.
Italian emigrant colonialism in Egypt
Italians have had a long history in Egypt. Merchants from Venice, Genova, and
other prominent Italian port cities had markets and even homes in Alexandria and
29. Choate, 115.
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Cairo throughout the late medieval and renaissance periods of European history.
Under the reign of Mohammed Ali Pasha (1803–49) the status of Italians, and
Europeans in general, in Egypt made a dramatic shift. As part of his sweeping
military and economic reforms, Mohammed Ali relied heavily on European
assistance from both within and beyond Egypt. The pasha sent delegations of
students to France where they could observe French government and society,
while at the same time importing hundreds of European advisors to work directly
in the government bureaucracy and run various ministries, in addition to dozens
of European technicians and counselors.30 Italian influence on Mohammed
Ali’s government ran deep. The Egyptian state press opened in 1822, with
Italian typographic equipment and materials, and edited and published its first
book shortly thereafter—an Italian–Arabic dictionary that aimed to improve
international government correspondence, which was conducted largely in
French and Italian.31 By 1840, Clot Bey, a leading French physician who headed
medical reforms under the wali, estimated that there were 2,000 Italians living as
permanent residents in Egypt,32 mostly working as government advisors.
Throughout the following decades, thousands of other Europeans flocked
to Egypt, motivated by economic and political opportunities. As Mohammed Ali’s
dynasty, in concert with Britain and France, undertook immense construction
projects—such as the Suez Canal—and other economic and commercial reforms,
the Egyptian economy grew tremendously. This rapid development “created
30. Grange, I:507.
31. Anna Baldinetti, “Gli Italiani nella cultura egiziana, 1900–1930,” Levante 49, no. 1–2
(2002): 43–58, 46.
32. A. B. Clot-Bey, Aperçu général sur l’Egypte, 2 vols. (Masson et Cie, Paris: Fortin,
1840), I:167; cited by Amicucci, 81.
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lucrative opportunities for foreigners” and attracted thousands of immigrants
from Italy, Greece, and other Southern Mediterranean European countries,
since “the difficulty of making a decent living in their countries of origin was an
incentive to emigrate.”33 By 1907 the number of Italians in Egypt rose to 35,000
and Italians represented nearly 24% of the entire European population, which
made the Italian community the second largest foreign community in Egypt, after
the Greeks.34 The largest single surge in Italian immigration to Egypt occurred
between the censuses of 1897 and 1907—the community increased by 10,000 in
just ten years.35 This jump coincides with the institution of emigrant colonialism
following the Italian military failures in Eritrea and Somalia, and the influence
of government-backed migration is clearly visible. In 1907 38% of the Italian
community in Egypt lived in Cairo, 46% in Alexandria, with the remainder spread
throughout Upper and Lower Egypt and the Canal Zone.36 In 1897 most of the
Cairene Italians lived in Azbakiyya and al-Muski, one of the central thoroughfares
of medieval Islamic Cairo and home to the Khan al-Khalili market. After the surge
of immigration over the next decade, the geographic centers of Italians shifted
from al-Muski to ʿAbdin, Bulaq, and Shubra, important loci of the rising European
commercial sector.37
This move away from al-Muski to neighborhoods with a higher
concentration of Europeans highlights the rise in importance of Italian commerce
and government support in the early 1900s. The geographic and demographic
33. Beinin and Lockman, 35.
34. Amicucci, 82; Beinin and Lockman, 35; Grange, I:513.
35. Amicucci, 83.
36. Grange, I:509.
37. Amicucci, 87–88.
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shift towards ʿAbdin, the location of the khedival palace, indicates the increase
of Italian involvement in the Egyptian government. By 1904 nearly half of the
Europeans in the municipal government of Alexandria were Italians,38 and
in Cairo Italians were the second largest nationality employed by Egyptian
government ministries, after the British, who were the colonial rulers.39
Azbakiyya remained a center for Europeanized Cairene commerce, given its
large gardens and proximity to the newly built opera house, as Italians and
other Europeans were able to establish thriving private businesses such as
shops, tobacco stands, restaurants, and cafés.40 Neighborhoods renovated and
revitalized during the first years of the British occupation, such as Shubra and
Bulaq, became centers of Italian residential life. The primary Italian consulate
today remains in Bulaq, a vestige of the neighborhood’s emigrant heritage.
While there was a permanent core of Italian residents in Egypt, a large
number of poorer migrants came for seasonal work before returning to Italy.
Although the Italian population grew tremendously between 1897 and 1907—an
increase of over 10,000 new migrants—a number far greater departed Egypt.
Between 1904–1907 alone nearly 14,000 Italians left Egypt for Italy.41 It is
impossible to tell how many of those departures were permanent and how
many lasted only for a few months or weeks. Cheap steam ferries made the
trans-Mediterranean voyage more convenient and led to an increase in two-way
human movement between Egypt and Italy. This was particularly important
38. Grange, I:517.
39. Petricioli, 86.
40. André Raymond, Cairo: City of History, trans. Willard Wood (Cairo: American
University in Cairo Press, 2001), 315.
41. Amicucci, 93–94.
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for poorer Europeans who were unable to establish cafés, printing presses, or
factories in Azbakiyya and Bulaq, as their better-off compatriots had done. A
large subset of the Italian community consisted of less-skilled and unskilled
laborers who came to work as temporary factory or construction workers. As
economic opportunities for emigrant foreigners increased, though, Italians were
much more likely to remain in Egypt. The account of one typical Italian expatriate
worker corroborates this trend:
R.’s father owned a flour mill near Syracuse which had to be sold to
pay the inheritance taxes after his father died in 1903. The sons left
the country; R. went to Egypt to look for work, leaving his wife and six
children behind. After six months in a carpentry shop in Alexandria, R.
worked in construction and learned masonry. His higher wages allowed
him to bring his family to settle in Cairo where he worked as a stonecutter
at the British army barracks in ʿAbbasiyya.42
R., facing economic difficulties at home, moved to Egypt in search of
better work, and most likely never fully intended to permanently settle down.
However, the economic conditions created by Ottoman capitulations, which
advantages had only flourished after the direct British occupation, favored
foreign workers and interests, so much that “these foreigners, generally poor
peasants or workers in their countries of origin, filled the upper ranks for the
working class in Egypt and occupied a highly disproportionate share of the
skilled, supervisory, and technical positions.”43 Following their move to Egypt,
R.’s family likely began to become more involved with the local community. Far
from the Italian homeland, countless Italian migrants like R. faced a type of crisis
42. Beinin and Lockman, 36.
43. Ibid., 36.
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of identity—were they full Italians, as the Italian government wanted them to be,
or did they identify themselves as something else: Egyptianized mutamassirun?
As discussed previously, Italy feared potential emigrant assimilation and
Egyptianization, as it posed a threat to their strategy of colonial emigration. If
emigrants saw themselves as mutamassirun more than Italians, remittances
would cease, international Italian prestige would no longer grow, and Einaudi’s
theory of the Italian merchant prince would fail. To mitigate this risk, the Italian
foreign ministry, in concert with SDA, Italica Gens, and other international
emigrant organizations worked to build up italianità among the Italians in Egypt.
Dozens of schools, both Catholic and secular, were established and focused on
teaching the Italian language. SDA took responsibility for the secular education
and Italianization of the Egyptian colony, with the stated goal to “encourage
the study of the national language in institutes connected to the Society [SDA]
and make the homeland understand the necessity of increasing the number of
national schools [in Egypt] in order to reinforce strict italianità.”44 As part of
this agenda of strengthening italianità through cultural and secular education, in
1905 the Egyptian branches of SDA adopted the following strategy for completing
their task:
1. Support Italian state schools.
2. Promote conferences.
3. Establish a periodical or magazine as the main editorial organ for the
Society in Egypt.
4. Develop serial schools to offer Italian language classes to working
class adults.
5. Find larger locations that were more amenable to these schools.
44. L. A. Balboni, Gl’Italiani nella civiltà egiziana del secolo XIX, 3 vols. (Alexandria,
Egypt: Penasson (Comitato Alessandrino della Società Dante Alighieri), 1906), III: 232–33.
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6. Establish a public library with an open reading room.
7. Institute a circulating library.
8. Encourage theatrical productions.
9. Introduce Italian classes in private foreign schools for the benefit of
the Italian pupils that attend.45
Like its many other branches in Europe and the Americas, the SDA’s
primary focus was on cultural education. In Egypt it sought to open public
libraries and hold cultural activities that featured drama and music. It opened
dozens of serial schools to teach Italian language and culture to the large
numbers of lower class Italians who spent their days working in factories
or shops. The Central Council of the SDA, headquartered in Rome, received
government subsidies and provided the Alexandrian and Cairene branches with
thousands of francs annually for operation expenses.46
More important than these cultural undertakings, though, was the
establishment of formal schools. In 1905 the director of the Society bemoaned
the indifferent attitude of the Egyptian colony towards patriotism. The solution
to this cynical indifference was clear: “For the citizens that too easily forget
the duties of our civilization, we must remember that national schools, where
along with Italian knowledge one also learns the religion of [patriotic] duty,
represent the strength of the colony’s unity.… It is therefore necessary that our
citizens rally to our national schools as if they were our flag, for in them they
receive true Italian education as children of all Italians.”47 The SDA hoped to
increase the quality of Italian state schools, which had fallen behind German,
45. Balboni, III: 233.
46. Ibid., III: 233.
47. Ibid., 243.
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French, and British schools, due to minor budgetary shortfalls and general
lack of interest among the Egyptian elite—Italian had been abandoned as an
Egyptian administrative language, in favor of French and English.48 The Society
made plans to institute two public primary schools for boys, a similar school for
girls, and several secondary schools in order to compete with other European
schools.49 Additionally, as listed in the Society’s general strategy, SDA worked
to open Italian language classes in the competing foreign schools until the
curriculum of the Italian state schools was sufficiently strengthened. In 1910 the
Italian parliament passed legislation providing better funding for international
Italian schools, and the quality and enrollment in those schools in Cairo and
Alexandria increased, thereby promoting both italianità and Italian prestige
throughout Egypt.50
Egypt as back door to Libya
As was the case with most aspects of emigrant colonialism, Italian state schools
funded by the SDA served a double purpose. The schools not only infused the
community with a deep sense of Italian language and culture, they provided
an avenue for the ruling Egyptian elite to provide European education for their
children. This direct influence on the education of the rising generation of elite
was aimed at bolstering Italian prestige in Egypt “in preparation for the day
48. Angelo Sammarco, Gli Italiani in Egitto: il contributo italiano nella formazione
dell’Egitto moderno (Alexandria, Egypt: Angelo Procaccia, 1937), 162.
49. Balboni, III: 240.
50. Sammarco, 162.
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when Italy would seize political control”;51 the day when the years of emigrant
colonialism would finally pay off and Italy would become a great and respected
imperial power.
Italy was not to keep colonial emigration as their final strategy in foreign
policy. From the defeat at Adwa in 1898 until 1911—the heyday of emigrant
colonialist policy—the Italian government remained committed behind the
scenes to restarting their ambitions of direct imperialism rather than build up a
tenuous global network of expatriate communities. A growing undercurrent of
anti-emigration Italian nationalists proposed the idea of invading and annexing
Libya as part of an effort to recreate the glory of the ancient Roman Empire.
The nationalists never referred to the Ottoman provinces as Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica, but rather Libya, the former Roman province carved from the
Carthaginian Empire after the Punic Wars in the 2nd century BC. They argued
that the Libyan Arabs would welcome the Italian army as liberators from the
oppressive Turks and that the military campaign would be an easy victory.52
Additionally, as Prime Minister Crispi had proposed with Eritrea and Somalia,
Italian politicians in the decade prior to 1911 heralded that a strong Italian
colony in Libya would redirect Italian emigration and replace America as the
main outlet for emigration. Libya would come so far as to be seen as the new
America; one Italian soldier in Libya wrote home to his family in October 1911,
51. Choate, 113.
52. Ibid., 172.
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“So dear father calm down and be happy because we are safe.… Dear father, I
ask you not to worry because here we really have America.”53
Italy had little presence in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica before the 1911
invasion and occupation. It did, however, have a long history in neighboring
Egypt, with its large Italian communities cum colonies in Cairo, Alexandria, and
the Suez Canal zone. Because the Italian government perceived the Italians
in Egypt to have high prestige within Egypt, the foreign ministry considered
Egypt to be the ideal base for Italian expansion throughout the Mediterranean,
and especially Libya.54 Rather than use Egypt as a forward operating base for
a military invasion, which was militarily and political impossible, Italy pursued
a subtle policy of pénétration pacifique,55 or peaceful penetration, and used
Egypt as the base for launching economic and agricultural programs into
the neighboring Ottoman provinces over the decade prior to the start of the
actual military campaign in 1911. Egypt, backed by a strong and united Italian
community, would become Italy’s cultural and economic backdoor to Libya.
53. Salvatore Bono, Morire per questi deserti: Lettere di soldati italiani dal fronte libico
(1911–12) (Catanzaro: Abramo, 1992), 57; cited in Choate, 180.
54. Anna Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo (Rome: Istituto per l’Oriente “C. A.
Nallino”, 1997), 17.
55. Grange, II:1391.
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Chapter 2
Italianità vs. Mutamassiriyya
A popular story in Egypt during the late nineteenth century recounted that
during the Napoleonic expedition in Egypt, an Englishman and an Egyptian were
assigned to deliver a message to the Ottomans. At a certain point during their
journey the Egyptian’s horse stumbled and the Egyptian fell to the sand, cursing
in Piedmontese as he crashed. Surprised by his use of language, the Englishman
asked the Egyptian in Piedmontese, “Are you from Piedmonte?,” to which the
Egyptian responded “Yes, of course.” The Englishman replied, “I am too! What
are you doing here?”
“I’m being an Egyptian!”
“And I’m being an Englishman!”1
This apocryphal account highlights one of the most dynamic aspects
of Egyptian society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Despite the rise of a kind of proto-nationalism, identities and loyalties were
often fluid and shifting. Dozens of different ethnic groups and European
nationalities—Egyptians, Greeks, Italians, French, Maltese, British, Syrians,
Turks, Albanians, Armenians, Moroccans, and Belgians, to name a few—all
1. Amicucci, 81.
converged and mixed in Egypt. One modern fictional account demonstrates the
complexity of identity in nineteenth-century Egypt. In his semi-autobiographical
work Birds of Passage, Robert Solé briefly narrates the story of Henri Touta, a
francophile Greek Catholic Syrian who appointed himself as both the Peruvian
and Costa Rican consul in Egypt after Lichtenstein conferred upon him the title of
count as payment for his diplomatic services to their monarchy. However, despite
his multi-ethnic and multi-national identity and experience, Touta considered
himself an Egyptian.2 Although Henri Touta is fictional, his character represents
a larger historical trend: as thousands of outsiders flocked to Egypt in the
late nineteenth century, they began to take on a new hybrid, Egyptianized,
identity—they became mutamassirun, or Egyptianized foreigners.3
Perceptions of the role of the mutamassirun in Egyptian society, as
well as and the definitions of Italianness, Egyptianness, or what I have termed
mutamassiriyya4 have varied widely in Egyptian historiography. Some schools of
thought have portrayed the mutamassirun as fundamental to the establishment
of modern Egypt and see the foreigners as veritable heroes. Others see
them as imperialist pawns, used to spread European influence in Egypt and
force unwanted negative societal and economic changes upon the emerging
Egyptian nation. Understanding these differing historiographic trends will aid in
understanding the approach of this thesis regarding the Italian foreign ministry’s
policy towards the Italian community in the years preceding the invasion of Libya.
2. Robert Solé, Birds of Passage (London: Harvill Press, 2000), 279.
3. Beinin and Lockman, 9.
4. Arabic for mutamassirness; the essence of being an Egyptianized foreigner.
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The mutamassirun as cosmopolitan Egyptians:
nationalism and royalism
In her biography of Mohammed Ali, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot presents a
near-native Egyptian leader who cared deeply about the future of his beloved
proto-independent nation by pursuing enlightened economic and political
policies. As part of a massive mercantilist program he undertook agricultural
reforms, built up internal infrastructure, and imposed protective tariffs on
foreign imports. Additionally he launched a wide reaching military campaign
which aimed to raise Egypt to the same level as other European empires of the
time. Marsot claims that these reforms were motivated by genuine concern
for Egypt and the pasha pursued them without interference from Europe. She
acknowledges the historical fact that hundreds, if not thousands, of Europeans
assisted in these reforms—many of whom would become the mutamassirun of the
early twentieth century. Marsot, like other Egyptian nationalist historians, frames
her concept of Egyptian nationalism as an unchanging, timeless characteristic of
the Egyptian people and she attributes Egypt’s initial foray into modernization
and nationalism to the dynamic personality and inspired leadership of
Mohammed Ali, who provided the spark to end the dormant Egyptian spirit—in
fact, she says, it was Mohammed Ali and his administration who “inevitably
put Egypt on the path of independent statehood and self-recognition.”5 For
nationalist historians, Egyptians, not Europeans, were the agents of change.
5. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammed Ali (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 264.
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Paradoxically, however, Mohammed Ali was hardly an “Egyptian” by even
Marsot’s standards. The wali himself was a foreigner—an Albanian who was
commissioned by the Sublime Porte in Istanbul to govern Egypt. He spoke little
Arabic and most likely had no real connection to “regular” lower-class Egyptians,
whose dormant Egyptian nationalist flame he would supposedly ignite. Marsot
does make an attempt to excuse the wali’s shortcomings as a non-Egyptian
foreigner: she claims that he used European counsellors merely as advisors and
had them sent home after implementing their recommendations.6 Additionally,
Marsot attempts to excuse Mohammed Ali’s foreignness, to little success; as
Ehud Toledano has humorously pointed out, “Marsot’s Mehmet Ali indeed had
the well-being of Egypt and the Egyptians at the top of his priorities. So much so,
that he even desired to become an Egyptian, but alas, psychologically he simply
could not, pauvre Pasha.”7 While other historiographic paradigms have proven
the large distance between the Ottoman-speaking Egyptian throne and the lower
class, Arabic-speaking population, Marsot papers over the linguistic and cultural
divide in order to ascribe the origins of Egyptian nationalism to Mohammed Ali’s
dynasty. Marsot’s European-inspired concept of modern nationalism needed a
hero. Mohammed Ali, with his foreignness hidden by creative historiographic
acrobatics, could fill that role.
By extension, this school of modern nationalist historiography attributes
the development of modern Egypt in part to Europeans and the mutamassirun.
6. Marsot, 194–95.
7. Ehud R. Toledano, “Mehmet Ali Paşa or Muhammad Ali Basha? An Historiographic
Appraisal in the Wake of a Recent Book,” Middle Eastern Studies 21, no. 4 (Oct. 1985): 141–159,
156.
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While Marsot vehemently repudiates the Europeanness or foreignness of the
khedival throne, other scholars have historically embraced the influence of the
mutamassirun in Egyptian nationalist history. This historiographic trend was
unsurprisingly adopted by the Europeans and Egyptians who worked within the
khedival bureaucracy. Rifaʿa Rafiʿ al-Tahtawi, one of the most prominent khedival
advisors who led educational missions to Europe as part of Mohammed Ali’s
programs of modernization, encouraged the throne to support the immigration
of foreigners “so that they could pass on skills to Egyptians in return for being
treated as Egyptians themselves.” He justified his position by citing Ancient
Egyptian history, indicating that in the sixth century BC, pharaoh Psammetichos
I encouraged Greek settlement in Egypt, which in turn reinforced diplomatic and
cultural ties with Greece and mutually strengthened the two empires.8
Royalist historiography differs from the modern nationalist in that, rather
than excuse or ignore European involvement in Egyptian society, royalists
fully acknowledge the heavy European presence in the khedival bureaucracy.
According to royalists, the mutamassirun were directly connected to the
Egyptian government by virtue of the numerous economic and legal advantages
guaranteed them by the Capitulations. Royalist historians were members of
scientific and academic institutes such as the Institut d’Égypte and the Royal
Geographical Society, which were often funded by the throne, and wrote
glowingly of the foreign contributions to the Egyptian economy and political
system.9 Royalist scholarship viewed the mutamassirun as part of a larger
8. Anthony Gorman, Historians, State And Politics In Twentieth Century Egypt:
Contesting the Nation (London: Routledge, 2003), 177.
9. Ibid., 177.
29
mission to modernize Egypt and bring it up European standards of governance,
industry, and intellect, and emphasized the deep integration of these resident
foreigners in Egyptian society. Mutamassir integration in certain levels of
Egyptian society was indeed far-reaching—beyond the government bureaucracy
mutamassirun were involved in construction, dock loading, printing presses,
cafés, and dozens of other sectors of the economy. After the first Aswan Dam was
completed in 1902, the builders installed a commemorative plaque that highlights
the multi-ethnic character of the Egyptian economy at the time:
This dam was designed and built by British engineers
Egyptians assisted by Greeks excavated
To the rock foundations and
Built the rubble masonry
Skilled Italian workmen dressed and built
The granite ashlar10
The construction of the dam was truly an international endeavor—Italian
laborers were brought in to excavate some of the hardest granite with
dynamite,11 and the bulk of the project was led by British and other European
engineers and contractors. The question of whether or not the mutamassir
workers saw the project as contributing to the rising glory of modern Egypt,
or simply just another construction job, is inconsequential to the royalists. For
royalists the mutamassirun were part of Egypt’s cosmopolitan golden age and
contributed greatly to the development of modern Egypt; without foreign aid
Egypt would have failed to achieve modernity.
10. Gorman, 195.
11. Federico Cresti, “Comunità proletarie italiane nell’Africa mediterranea tra XIX secolo
e periodo fascista,” Mediterranea 5 (2008): 189–214, 201.
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The mutamassirun as Egyptians: The “myth” of
mutamassir Egypt
The story of the famous twentieth-century Italian hermetic poet, Giuseppe
Ungaretti, who was born in 1888 in Alexandria, highlights the self-perception of
the Italian mutamassirun. Like countless other Italians, Ungaretti’s father had
moved to Egypt in search of financial opportunity and had found employment
with a construction company in the Suez Canal zone. Two years after Ungaretti
was born his father suffered a fatal construction accident, leaving his widowed
mother to take care of the young family. Like many mutamassir immigrants,
Ungaretti’s family was rather poor; after the death of his father, his mother
was constrained to open a bakery to support herself and her children.12 While
growing up in Alexandria, Ungaretti built friendships with other mutamassirun.
One of his closest friends, Mohammed Shehab, was Syrian and later moved to
Paris with Ungaretti to attend university. In 1913, while in Paris, Mohammed
committed suicide. Three years later, Ungaretti wrote about the cause of this
tragedy:
12. Mohebb Saad Ibrahim, “L’Egitto di Ungaretti,” in Tradizione e modernizzazione in
Egitto: 1798-1998, ed. Paolo Branca, Collana storica del Centro studi per i popoli extraeuropei
dell’Università di Pavia, no. 16 (Milan: F. Angeli, 2000), 159.
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Si chiamava
Moammed Sceab
discendente
di emiri di nomadi
suicida
perchè non aveva più
Patria
Amò la Francia
e mutò nome
Fu Marcel
ma non era Francese
e non sapeva più vivere
nella tenda dei suoi
dove si ascolta la cantilena
del Corano …
His name was
Mohammed Shehab
descendent
of emirs and nomads
He committed suicide
because he no longer had
a nation
He loved France
and changed his name
He became Marcel
but he was not French
and he could not live
in the tent of his people
where one hears the chanting
of the Qurʾana
a. Giuseppe Ungaretti,
“In memoria,” in Selected Poems
of Giuseppe Ungaretti, ed. Allen
Mandelaum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1975), 10, emphasis
added.
According to Ungaretti, Mohammed Shehab no longer knew how to
live according to his princely Islamic heritage. Mohammed was not Egyptian;
he was Syrian, living an expatriate life comparable to Ungaretti’s. Because of
the cosmopolitanism of mutamassir Egypt he lacked any firm identity—he was
lost in the urban chaos of Alexandria and Paris. Ungaretti’s emphasis on the
universal need for identity is logical—he wrote this ode while in the cold and
bloody trenches of the Isonzo and Carso between Italy and Austria-Hungary
during World War I. Ironically, though, even as an Italian infantryman, Ungaretti
himself lacked a firm identity—raised in Egypt and schooled in Paris he nearly
gave his life for Italy in a global war over national identities.
Further examination of Ungaretti’s experience reveals more of this
paradox of national identity. When speaking of Middle Easterners, he referred
to them as “noi orientali”—us orientals—including himself in the definition of
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an oriental.13 In his mind, despite the seeming contradictions in his identity, he
was at heart an Egyptian. In a poem penned after a particularly bloody battle
along the northern Italian border, he still remembered his oriental homeland with
affection.
Ora
Il sereno è chiuso
Come
A quest’ora
Nel mio paese d’Affrica
I gelsumini
Now
Serenity is closed
Like
Right now
In my land of Africa
The jasminesa
a. Giuseppe Ungaretti,
“Giugno,” in Mandelaum, 48, emphasis
added.
Ungaretti’s rosy memory of his expatriate homeland is part of what
Marta Petricioli has described as “il mito,” or the “myth” of mutamassir Egypt.14
Because of Italy’s longstanding history in Egypt, from its hundreds of khedival
government advisors, to the thousands of Italian laborers at the Suez Canal and
Aswan Dam, Italians resident in Egypt genuinely felt a part of cosmopolitan
Egypt—truly felt integrated as part of the Egyptian national fabric. While their
italianità and mutamassiriyya blended fluidly, both forms of identity were social
constructions. Italians in Egypt were often “the children of Greek, Egyptian,
Armenian, Syrian, Lebanese, or Maltese mothers.”15 Because of this ethnic,
religious, and national diversity, members of the Italian community attended
synagogues, mosques, and churches for baptisms, bar mitzvahs, weddings, and
funerals. According to Petricioli, in practice the Italian mutamassirun could
13. Ibrahim, 161.
14. Petricioli.
15. Ibid., viii.
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hardly call themselves either Egyptian or Italian. Despite Ungaretti’s nostalgia
for his “oriental” homeland and his gentle criticism of Mohammed Shehab’s
lack of national identity, while in Egypt, Ungaretti himself was neither Italian or
Egyptian. Mutamassiriyya defined his identity.
The mutamassirun as imperialists: colonialists,
militant nationalists, and Islamists
Colonialism has also been used as a historiographic paradigm to describe
the history of the mutamassirun. For colonialists, the mutamassirun were
unwilling pawns in a larger imperial game. Much like Choate’s theory of
emigrant colonialism, Michael Reimer has argued that Europe used expatriates
in Egypt to force spatial change and increase potential colonial control of the
country. Reimer’s basic premise is that Alexandria in the nineteenth century
was a bellwether of European colonial ambitions; the same patterns of urban
colonization in Alexandria were followed later in Cairo and the Canal Zone. In
essence, he states, “Alexandria was a colonial city before Egypt was a colony.”16
Reimer bases his thesis on the theory of colonial urbanism posited by R. J.
Ross and Gerard Telkamp in 1984, which states that colonial powers often force
spatial change in certain bridgehead cities to shift the socio-political status quo,
giving the colonizers an upper hand in controlling the country; that is, urban
planning is used for colonial consolidation. Alexandria was a textbook example
of forced spacial change. At the turn of the century, during the Napoleonic
16. Michael J. Reimer, “Colonial Bridgehead: Social and Spatial Change in Alexandria,
1850-1882,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 20, no. 4 (Nov. 1988): 531–53, 531.
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invasion, only 8,000 people lived in Alexandria; fewer than 100 were foreigners.17
By the 1860s, however, the population had risen to more than 170,000 with
a large percentage of immigrants from Europe and other nearby Ottoman
provinces, primarily Syria. As the population grew, the city rapidly expanded
outward towards the desert and along the Mediterranean coast. These new urban
expansions followed European norms of urban planning and design and attracted
richer classes of Europeans.
One suburb, al-Raml, was built along the coast ten kilometers away from
the city center. The land was initially owned by the military and illegally occupied
by European squatters, but European investors saw the potential in the land and
procured it from the Egyptian government. Al-Raml soon became “a fashionable
suburb with large homes, shops, flower gardens, hotels, and a Khedivial palace,”
marketed for wealthy Europeans and Egyptian royalty.18 Al-Raml was an isolated
European neighborhood secluded from the rest of Alexandria and became a
prominent symbol of European colonial desires for the rest of the country.
Alexandria experienced an “urban bifurcation”19 and became a dual city—wealthy
Europeans lived far in their suburbs and commuted downtown to run their
shops and businesses while Egyptians and working-class Europeans stayed in
Alexandria proper.
Cairo underwent a similar geographic division in the decades following
the establishment of an urban colonial bridgehead in Alexandria. As European
17. Reimer, “Colonial Bridgehead: Social and Spatial Change in Alexandria, 1850-1882,”
532.
18. Ibid., 536.
19. Ibid., 538.
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powers became increasingly involved in Egypt both economically and politically,
a massive influx of European and Levantine migrants entered Cairo and began
to transform the city. Under the reign of Khedive Ismaʿil, Cairo’s urban nature
went through a process of bifurcation as “native” and “European” cities emerged.
The area bounded by Bab al-Hadid to the north, Azbakiyya and ʿAbdin to the east,
Sayyida Zaynab to the south, and the Nile to the west, was markedly European
and featured wide streets, foreign markets, and European architecture, while
the rest of the city remained “anarchic” and “native.”20 The two regions were
separated by an invisible, yet powerful, frontier which bound Cairenes to their
respective mutamassir or Egyptian worlds.
The idea of urban colonialism is closely tied to the larger ontological
framework of imperialism proposed by Timothy Mitchell in his noteworthy book
Colonising Egypt. Mitchell proposes that during the late nineteenth century,
Europe became enthralled with the idea of organizing the world and reinforcing
the Benjaminesque ideal of the “certainty of representation.”21 Microcosmic
models, managed by Europe, could be used to explain and rule over every aspect
of the vast European empires. In fact, “everything seemed to be set up before
one as though it were the model or the picture of something. Everything was
arranged before an observing subject into a system of signification (to use the
European jargon), declaring itself to be the signifier of a signified.”22 This novel
worldview—that of the world as an exhibition or a model or be controlled—led
20. Raymond, 333.
21. Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),
6.
22. Ibid., 12.
36
imperial leaders to hubristically proclaim that “England is at present the greatest
Oriental empire which the world has ever known,”23 for only Britain was capable
of using rational thought to control the Orient. Europe set the requirements for
modernity and provided the true ideal model for achieving modernization. Egypt’s
urban transformation in Alexandria and Cairo is reflective of the European idea
that Egypt was merely a model to be controlled—an exhibit to be ordered. Much
like the royalist historians, European powers, as documented by colonialist
historians, believed that the mutamassirun were the only capable agents of
reform and change in Egypt because of their ability to model the world and use
rational thought, and consequently, European colonial administrations used
mutamassir talent to remake Egypt.
While both the royalists and colonialists connected the mutamassirun
to the khedive and British imperialism, those who were excluded from the elite
European center of power—militant nationalists and Islamists—had an entirely
different, and overwhelmingly pessimistic, view of the role of the mutamassirun
in Egyptian society. While in most circumstances the trajectories of nationalist
and Islamist historiography are wildly divergent, their views of the mutamassirun
are surprisingly coincident. In these historiographic schools the mutamassirun
are seen as outsiders and are “regarded at best as passive beneficiaries of British
authority and at worst active supporters of British imperialism.”24 Islamists
such as Muhammed al-Ghazzali and Sayyid Qutb labeled the mutamassirun
as mustaʿmirun dakhiliyyun, or domestic imperialists, and accused them of
23. Mitchell, 7.
24. Gorman, 179.
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“introducing an alien culture into Egyptian society and corrupting its traditional
values.”25 As Egyptian nationalism took deeper root and anti-British and other
xenophobic sentiments grew, the royalist heritage of the mutamassirun was
vilified and erased. In 1947, at the apex of Wafdist nationalism, the plaque at the
Aswan Dam was “deemed unsuitable” and was removed on the grounds that it
did “not shed a true light of things.” The dam’s mutamassir legacy was forgotten
and the dam was declared a purely Egyptian construction. The mutamassirun
were “erased from the record by the ideological demands of national discourse,”
and unfortunately became “historiographical casualties” in Egyptian nationalist
history.26
The mutamassirun as compradors: the materialists
Related to militant nationalism is the Marxist materialist school of historiography,
which, like the nationalists and Islamists, viewed at least a section of the
mutamassir community negatively. In the wake of the 1919 nationalist movement,
the mutamassirun were increasingly seen by materialists as a “comprador,
non-national bourgeoise” which, despite their status as a strong middle class,
lacked commitment to national independence.27 For these historians, the
mutamassirun were not “real” Egyptians and thus contributed little to the
nationalist independence effort. Beyond being cast as simply removed from the
nationalist effort, the opposition of the mutamassirun to a purely Egyptian state is
25. Gorman, 184.
26. Ibid., 195, 145.
27. Ibid., 181.
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often interpreted as anti-Egyptian and overly capitalist and pro-Western. Because
of their goal of analyzing the emergence of an independent Egyptian labor
movement, Beinin and Lockman tend to label the entire mutamassir population
as merely a colonial arm of the government. For the most part, expatriate
mutamassirun are exempted from the rising social movements since, according
to Beinin and Lockman’s historiographic trajectory, Egyptian labor movements
led to a reinforcement of indigenous nationalist thought. The mutamassirun
were not part of (or at least marginally part of) the Egyptian working class, and
as the Egyptian state swelled with nationalist fervor, the government pursued
corporatist economic policies and sought to minimize the impact of the foreign
sectors of the economy. Throughout Workers on the Nile, Beinin and Lockman
repeatedly refer to the negative effects of mutamassirun on the local Egyptian
economy, always linking mutamassir capital with the elite financial resources
of foreign investors and the Egyptian state.28 These Europeans filled the upper
echelons of the working class and “occupied a highly disproportionate share of
the skilled, supervisory, and technical positions,”29 a division which caused much
social and class tension with the Egyptian workers.
Beinin and Lockman’s definition of mutamassirun focuses on the smaller
section of the foreign European population that was actually directly involved in
commerce and business, which indeed had connections to foreign governments
and companies, and fails to include the larger portion of mutamassirun who
were migrant workers. As stated previously, in the wake of the completion
28. Beinin and Lockman, 23.
29. Ibid., 36.
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of the Suez Canal, “the rapid development of the Egyptian economy created
lucrative opportunities for foreigners, while the difficulty of making a decent
living in their countries of origin was an incentive to emigrate.”30 Within the
separated European world—the European center of Cairo build by Ismaʿil, or the
isolated community of al-Raml—these migrants continued to struggle financially,
even if their economic situations had indeed improved from when they were in
Europe. R., mentioned in the previous chapter, was constrained to change jobs to
eventually bring his family to join him in Egypt, and the Ungarettis in Alexandria
never became wealthy as bakers. Even in Egypt, Italian construction workers
and dock loaders faced low wages and poor working conditions, and European
workers were among the first in Egypt to unionize and strike.
Besides grouping all mutamassirun under the same comprador label,
materialists fail to fully account for the phenomenon of shifting identities—the
aforementioned “myth of Egypt.” In materialist historiography nationality
overrides class identity. For example, in 1919, following World War I, the workers
of the Suez Canal Company unionized in an effort to permanently secure their
wartime benefits, including a set wage scale, bonus pay for holiday work, and an
eight hour workday. The union, named Le Phénix, was led primarily by Greeks,
who notably “reached across ethnic lines to their disadvantaged Egyptian fellow
workers,” in a display of class solidarity.31 A similar Italian union soon joined with
Le Phénix because of Italian contempt towards the British after the war—they
felt slighted over their perception of “Britain’s treacherous refusal to allow Italy
30. Beinin and Lockman, 28.
31. Ibid., 106–7.
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the rewards of her wartime sacrifices.”32 Beinin and Lockman’s analysis of the
strike then shifts away from looking at the inclusive coalition of exploited and
angry workers and instead looks at subsequent international politics behind the
resolution of the strike. They demonstrate that Britain, the backers of the Suez
Canal Company, sought to appease and contain the Greek and Italian workers,
and that immediately after settling with these foreigners, normal operations
resumed. They infer that the mutamassir workers had only gone on strike to
secure their own jobs and that showing solidarity with Egyptian workers was
only part of their overall strategy. For Beinin and Lockman, the nationality of the
workers was an obstacle to true class unity, thus proving that the mutamassirun
fell outside the world of the Egyptian working class. Furthermore, they tend to
portray foreign workers as proxies in a larger conflict between Britain, Greece,
and Italy, the large comprador nations which exploited capitalist development
in Egypt. Because of this, materialist history often falls in line with colonialist
and imperialist histories, which make a sharp distinction between Egyptian
and foreigner and fail to differentiate groups within the monolithic foreigner
population.33
However, as has been mentioned, European nations, especially Italy,
worried about the identity of their expatriate communities. National identities
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were far from static or
unchanging and the mutamassirun presented a difficult challenge for the Italian
government, so desperate to hold on to its empire-building emigrants. As Italians
32. Beinin and Lockman, 106–7.
33. Gorman, 183.
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became more involved with working-class Egyptians in the Canal Zone or in
Cairene factories, or with the cosmopolitan middle class isolated in the bifurcated
cities of Cairo and Alexandria, features of their Italian identity were slowly
lost. Ungaretti, like many other Europeans in Egypt, truly felt that he was an
Egyptian. In 1905 the Italian consul in Cairo, Giuseppe Raggi, complained in
a letter to the foreign ministry that over a fourth of the Italian community in
Egypt were Italian in name only and had no connection to the homeland—many
had lost their italianità despite government efforts to prevent integration
and assimilation.34 Materialist historiography fails to take into account the
phenomenon of mutamassiriyya, assuming instead that foreigners in Egypt
naturally followed what their respective home countries demanded.
Given this wide range of historiographic interpretation, few scholars have
looked at the relationship between European homelands and their respective
mutamassir communities. By looking at the policies and actions of European
countries towards their expatriate populations in Egypt, we can gain additional
insight into the history of the mutamassirun. The dynamism and importance
of the Italian mutamassir community becomes especially visible during the
previously mentioned shift in Italy’s imperial paradigm. Egypt, as the back door
to Libya, was a critical base for Italy’s operations of peaceful penetration to
Libya and the rest of the Mediterranean. The Italian foreign ministry undertook
a program of propaganda aimed at both the Egyptian and Arabic-speaking public,
as well as the Italian mutamassir colony, in order to manufacture consent for the
impending Libyan enterprise. The fact that Italy dedicated so many resources to
34. Petricioli, 1.
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prevent emigrant assimilation and create consensus for the invasion highlights
the fact that the mutamassirun were not as disengaged from Egyptian society as
the militant nationalists and materialists thought, nor were the mutamassirun as
linked to European imperial and economic policies as colonialists and royalists
have asserted.
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Chapter 3
Colonia in Colonia
The question of shifting identities among the Italian mutamassir colony in
Egypt was not the only problem Italy faced as it bolstered its Mediterranean
presence in preparation for its invasion of Libya. In practice, Italy had little actual
direct control over its global emigrant colonies since these communities were
established in dozens of different sovereign nations, ruled by varying systems
of law and ideology. Nations that hosted Italian emigrants could (and often did)
easily resist efforts of Italianization and protective measures were often enacted
to force immigrant assimilation, thus undermining Italy’s foreign policy. Italian
emigrant colonies were limited by their host nations; the Italian government
was unable to interfere directly in the affairs of the various host nations. Italy,
as a sending state, “could only create an open, indirect, and adaptive policy for
emigrants, relying upon persuasion, incentives, and sometimes deception.”1
Unlike other host nations like the United States, Argentina, or France, which
were independent and sovereign states, Egypt was a colonial protectorate, a de
facto colony under British administration. While the Italian government could
try to work directly with the American or Argentinian governments to lobby for
1. Choate, 15.
Italian issues, in Egypt they were forced to work indirectly with Britain, who
more or less controlled the khedival throne.
British imperial primacy in Egypt
Nearly every European nation had some measure of interest in the Ottoman
Empire in general. Starting in the 1500s, the French won a series of legal and
economic concessions which guaranteed freedom of movement throughout the
empire, regulated French trade according to French law rather than local laws,
exempted French businesses from all taxes and duties, ensured inviolability of
domicile, and established separate legal and judicial systems. Other European
powers quickly followed suit and used the French precedent to acquire their own
capitulatory privileges, such that by the nineteenth century, European powers
effectively had imperia in imperio, or empires within an empire.2 Following the
Industrial Revolution in the early 1800s, Europe was able to take advantage
of these Capitulations and flood the Ottoman market with products free from
protective tariffs. For example, in the 1840s in French-influenced Damascus
the indigenous textile industry faced an enormous economic challenge in the
face of European commercial advantages. Imported Swiss fabrics woven in
faux Damascene patterns were sold for 2 piasters per meter while equivalent
indigenous Syrian cloth sold for 4-5 times that amount.3 Capitulatory protections
from tariffs on cloth directly impacted the price of the cloth, which in turn had a
2. James B. Angell, “The Turkish Capitulations,” The American Historical Review 6, no. 2
(Jan. 1901): 254–259, 256.
3. Sherry Vatter, “Journeymen Textile Weavers in Nineteenth-Century Damsacus: A
Collective Biography,” chap. 5, in Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, ed. Edmund
Burke, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 83.
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negative impact on Syrian society, often leading to market failures or even violent
massacres.4
Egypt, as part of the Ottoman Empire, was not immune to the effects
of the Capitulations. Because of its large size and its vast agricultural and
commercial potential, Egypt was a battleground for competing European
interests. Much like Syria, in the early 1800s the Egyptian cloth industry faced
intense pressure from tariff-free French, Austrian, and British textiles, which
led to the collapse of Egyptian cloth production for export or local consumption
by 1820.5 As European powers gained economic primacy in Egypt they began
to vie for influence in the government, especially as Mohammed Ali embarked
on his program of military and political reforms. The Greeks were particularly
close to the Ottoman viceroy—Mohammed Ali was close to the Tossizza family
in Alexandria and granted them special business deals and appointed them to
political offices.6 As the Greeks grew in power, Britain faced stiff competition:
because of “‘their restless activity, their knowledge of the Levantine languages,
and their unscrupulous manner of doing business,’ Greek merchants were
driving native Englishmen out of the field.”7 Italians, helped by the Capitulations,
also gained favor with the khedival regime and secured political and economic
advantages. Ludovico Colucci was appointed as court doctor;8 Antonio Colucci
4. See Bruce Masters, “The 1850 Events in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria’s
Incorporation into the Capitalist World System,” International Journal of Middle East Studies
22, no. 1 (Feb. 1990): 3–20.
5. Fred H. Lawson, “Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt, 1820–1824,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 2 (May 1981): 131–153, 142.
6. Michael J. Reimer, Colonial Bridgehead: Government and Society in Alexandria,
1807-1882 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 84.
7. Ibid., 85, citing FO 142/15, Murray to Palmerston, Cairo, December 1, 1851.
8. Ettore Rossi, “Gl’Italiani in Egitto,” chap. 4, in Egitto Moderno (Roma: Edizioni Roma,
1939), 80.
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chaired the Egypt Commission on Health for nearly two decades;9 Licurgo
Santoni became director of the Egyptian postal system in Upper Egypt;10
Paternosto Bey held a “high position” in the Egyptian foreign ministry;11 Federico
Amici-Bey was head of the khedival Office of Statistics in the Ministry of Finance
from 1876–1883 and appointed his close friend, Giuseppe Randone, as his
successor.12 Firmly entrenched in the government and legally protected by the
provisions of the Capitulations, these Europeans had immense power over the
local administration of Egypt.
The influence of various European powers in Egypt waxed and waned
throughout the nineteenth century, each attempting to gain the ear of the
khedive while reducing potential competition from their European rivals.
Gradually, European business interests, protected by the Capitulations, led to
increased control of the Egyptian government, especially after the opening of the
Suez Canal, the construction of which placed an immense debt on the Egyptian
government and led to the institution of French and British Dual Control in 1876.
Additionally, in May 1876, France, Italy, and Austria established the Commission
of the Public Debt, which established the terms of repayment of the Suez debt. As
each European imperium in imperio encroached further on khedival sovereignty,
the risk of intra-European conflicts heightened, giving rise to “a new system
of intrigues, of conflicting ambitions, of suspicions and jealousies” among the
9. Rossi, 80.
10. Ibid., 81.
11. Ibid., 81.
12. Balboni, II: 265–66, 269–70.
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European powers in Egypt.13 Britain especially feared occupying Egypt directly
because of concerns that such an action would lead to direct conflict with France
and Italy.14
This uncertain atmosphere of jealous uncertainty lasted until 1881, when
a nascent national Egyptian movement, driven by “the desire to emancipate
themselves” from the heavy debt incurred by capitulatory concessions,15 revolted
under the leadership of General Ahmed ʿUrabi. European diplomats, investors,
merchants, and residents in Egypt feared losing their property, their influence,
and more importantly their capitulatory privileges.16 In July 1882 Britain,
proclaiming that it was acting in defense of all Europeans in Egypt, bombarded
Alexandria and invaded the mainland. Armed with the newly invented Gatling
machine gun, British marines quickly destroyed the nationalist movement and
took control of the entire country. Following the eight-week conflict, the British
held a grand parade in Cairo that spectacularly vaunted British technical and
military prowess. The parade was symbolic—“more than a mere spectacle, the
display of arms demonstrated to an ‘Eastern population’ [and rival European
powers] the effectiveness and authority of Britain’s military occupation.”17 With
its victory over the ʿUrabi Revolt, Britain asserted itself as the indisputable
European colonial ruler in Egypt, simultaneously fortifying European capitulatory
privileges and putting an end to the fragile system of European jealousies that
13. R. C. Mowat, “From Liberalism to Imperialism: The Case of Egypt 1875-1887,” The
Historical Journal 16, no. 1 (Mar. 1973): 109–124, 111.
14. Ibid., 110–11.
15. Reimer, Colonial Bridgehead, 170.
16. Juan Cole, Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural Origins
of Egypt’s ʿUrabi Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 281.
17. Mitchell, 128–29.
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previously determined European involvement in Egypt. Italian, Greek, and French
mutamassir involvement in the Egyptian government declined sharply as British
colonial officials filled their positions; one Italian historian and former lawyer
in the Mixed Court system wrote that after the British occupation “the ranks
of [Italian bureaucrats] thinned and in many departments you could count the
number of Italians on your fingers.”18 The arrangement of European imperia in
imperium thus transformed into European coloniae in colonia, or colonies within
a colony—any “lesser” European power had to pursue its colonial interests within
the British colonial protectorate of Egypt.
Italian imperialism within a British colony
As discussed previously, Italy’s strategy in Egypt in the early twentieth century
was twofold: (1) strengthen the italianità of its emigrant expatriate colony,
and (2) use Egypt’s central location and political clout as a base for spreading
pro-Italian propaganda throughout the region in preparation for the impending
colonial invasion of Libya. As Italy pursued this dual mission it was constrained
to act within the framework of British protectorate, follow British rules, and
give general deference to Britain, the clear colonial ruler. Whenever the Italian
government attempted to engage the khedive directly in matters related to
Italian colonial and imperial pursuits, the Italian foreign ministry was forced to
ensure that their political goals in Egypt did not disrupt the colonial balance and
consequently infringe upon British power. Three diplomatic incidents in early
18. Edoardo D. Bigiavi, Noi e l’Egitto (Livorno: San Belforte, E. C., 1911), 16.
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1910 exemplify the tightrope that the Italian government was forced to walk as
it attempted to pursue its own colonial interests within the British colony.
Banco di Roma was unique among Italian banks of the early twentieth
century. For decades Italian banks generally had some measure of international
presence, especially as Italian emigration skyrocketed in the late nineteenth
century, but the majority of these branches, mostly subsidiaries of the larger
Banco di Napoli, were non-profit branches charged with receiving remittances
from emigrant workers abroad. Banco di Roma was founded in 1880 with
substantial capital from the Vatican, and was the first Italian financial institution
to establish for-profit branches internationally. Two years after starting a Parisian
branch, in 1904 Banco di Roma opened an office in Alexandria. Following the
success of these two international divisions, the bank quickly built up a “ring of
gold” that encircled the Mediterranean basin, with offices in Cairo, Malta, and
Madrid.19 The Italian government soon realized that the bank could contribute to
Italy’s goal of increased economic influence in the Mediterranean, and Banco di
Roma was adopted as “the Italian government’s chosen instrument to carry out
its policy of ‘peaceful penetration.’”20 Like much of Italy’s foreign policy at the
time, the bank’s activities and investments throughout the Mediterranean often
served a dual purpose: beyond basic banking and investments, Banco di Roma
was used to spread Italian influence. This was especially true in Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica, where the bank pursued the bulk of its economic development
projects—it even went so far as to build its Tripoli branch inside the Roman
19. Grange, II:1407.
20. Timothy Childs, Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya: 1911–1912 (Leiden:
Brill, 1990), 32.
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Victory Arch of Marcus Aurelius, a symbolic declaration of Italy’s economic
imperial ambitions in the Mediterranean.21 Banco di Roma’s investments in Libya
were wide reaching and comprehensive. The bank financed a steamship company,
La Navigazione Generale Italiana, which ran regular service between Malta,
Tripoli, Benghazi, Alexandria, and Istanbul. The bank oversaw and subsidized
the construction of a railroad line connecting Tripoli and Alexandria, in addition
to numerous other public works projects ranging from the construction of a
telegraph system between Western Egypt and Cyrenaica, to investment in new
agricultural techniques in Libya, to the digging of phosphate mines in Egypt’s
Western Desert.22
At the end of April 1910 a representative of Banco di Roma, Enrico
Bresciani, travelled to Cairo to hold a private audience with Khedive ʿAbbas
Helmi II. The khedive had expressed interest in becoming involved with some
of Banco di Roma’s development plans, specifically those projects, such as
phosphate mining and the railroad, that dealt with Egypt directly. The Italian
consul-general in Cairo, G. De Martino, hurriedly wrote to the foreign minister,
Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, expressing his concern over their meeting. He
warned that any visible cooperation between the khedive and Banco di Roma
would be a grave political error.23 Because Banco di Roma was perceived (and
acted) as an arm of the Italian government, the khedive’s cooperation in Italian
colonialist projects would signal to Egypt and the British government that he
21. Choate, 173.
22. Grange, II:1436–44.
23. De Martino to San Giuliano, letter, Apr. 20, 1910, in I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
(1908–1914), vol. 5/6, ed. Edoardo Del Vecchio, quarta serie (11 Dicembre 1909–29 Marzo 1911)
(Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Libreria dello Stato, 2001) (henceforth cited as
DDI IV), 228–29 (no. 228).
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was working with Italy. De Martino feared that this would in turn result in a
loss of Italian moral position within Egypt, as Egyptians would see their ruler
working with a European power in neighboring Libya, an action that smacked
of imperialism. Moreover, both the khedive and the Italian foreign ministry were
restricted by the British, who, as the khedive’s colonial backers, also would have
been implicated in an Italian imperial endeavor. Understanding these risks,
De Martino suggested to San Giuliano that they ensure that no agreement be
made between the khedive and Banco di Roma.24 San Giuliano contacted the
head of the bank in Rome and commanded him to call off Bresciani and avoid
any investment deals with the khedive beyond the mining and railroad projects,
which took place entirely in Egypt. He then instructed De Martino to keep a close
watch on Bresciani during his visit to confirm that no clandestine agreements
were reached.25 While the additional Egyptian capital would have been beneficial
for the bank’s development projects in Libya, which would have then furthered
Italy’s plans of regional economic “peaceful penetration,” the risk of embroiling
the khedive, and by extension the British, in these plans was too great. Italy was
thus restricted in its own imperial plans by its status as a colony-within-a-colony
in British Egypt.
Italy was also limited by Britain’s power in the arena of high level
royal politics. On April 29, 1910 the khedive informed De Martino that he was
planning to travel to London and Paris the coming summer, and that presumably
on the basis of his ongoing undisclosed collaboration with Italian plans for
24. De Martino to San Giuliano, see n. 23.
25. San Giuliano to De Martino, letter, 1007, Apr. 28, 1910, in DDI IV, 250 (no. 241).
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economic development in Egypt and Libya, he desired to have an audience with
King Vittorio Emanuele III in Italy. De Martino wrote to San Giuliano with his
full approval, stating that “given the high level of British interference in his
government, the khedive would be able to address many important issues”26 free
from the direct influence of London. Meeting with ʿAbbas outside of Egypt would
allow the Italian government to work directly with the khedive, thus avoiding the
pitfalls of pursuing their own imperial ambitions within the British protectorate.
Further, De Martino continued, such a royal visit would make an excellent
impression on both the Italian colony in Egypt and the indigenous population.27
The visit would demonstrate the cordial relationship between the two nations and
promote Italy’s image as a benevolent European power while showing that the
khedive was not beholden to British and French influence alone.
San Giuliano responded positively the next day, but his brief reply subtly
highlights the foremost drawback to within the British colonial system: “You
may inform the khedive that His Majesty will be happy to receive his visit next
summer. I have already advised the British government of our intentions and they
have indicated that are most pleased that the khedive will be visiting the king of
Italy.”28 Even though De Martino had cast the khedive’s forthcoming visit to Italy
as an opportunity to get around British restrictions, San Giuliano was forced to
go through the British diplomatic filter and inform the British of their plans. As
the British were in charge of the Egyptian colony, they had to give their blessing
26. De Martino to San Giuliano, letter, 1326/28, Apr. 29, 1910, in DDI IV, 251 (no. 243).
27. Ibid.
28. San Giuliano to De Martino, letter, 1041, Apr. 30, 1910, in DDI IV, 252–53 (no. 246),
emphasis added.
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to both the khedive and the Italian foreign ministry for any meeting to occur.
Despite this limitation, San Giuliano arranged for the visit to take place during
the last two weeks of July at the royal summer palace in Racconigi.
One week later, on May 6, Britain’s King Edward VII died, which
further complicated the scheduled khedival visit. Because of ʿAbbas’s colonial
relationship with Britain, it was necessary that he visit the British court before
visiting Italy for symbolic reasons—Egypt’s true ruler was Britain. The purpose
of his initial itinerary was precisely to visit Britain; his stopover in Racconigi was
planned as an afterthought to his larger European tour. Now that the king had
died, though, the only reason for the khedive to travel to London would be to
attend the funeral and George V’s subsequent coronation ceremony. ʿAbbas had
confided to De Martino, though, that he wanted to do everything possible to avoid
the coronation, because in the ceremonial procession “he would be presented as
the last of all the kings”;29 as merely a khedive he was at the bottom of Britain’s
imperial hierarchy, and thus wanted to avoid embarrassment at the ceremony.
Additionally, Sir Eldon Gorst, the British consul-general, counseled ʿAbbas to
postpone any visits to London for the remainder of the year, out of respect for
the mourning royal family. The khedive consequently had no reason to travel to
England and accordingly cancelled his summer visit to Vittorio Emanuele, asking
to reschedule it for the following summer.
De Martino, who had been so enthusiastic about the planned regal visit,
met with Gorst to see if other arrangements could be made. Gorst confirmed
29. De Martino to San Giuliano, letter, 720/256, May 27, 1910, in DDI IV, 309–310 (no.
298).
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that he had indeed asked the khedive to not visit London until the next year, but
that ʿAbbas was free to visit Italy without traveling to Britain first. However, the
khedive later confided to De Martino that while Gorst had given him permission
to travel, he felt that the British preferred he not go. Both De Martino and
ʿAbbas agreed that a visit dedicated entirely to the Italian king would lead to
“false political interpretations” that would give “political significance to his
visit to the king of Italy, and would show that the British king had not wanted to
receive the khedive.”30 Neither Italy nor ʿAbbas could act beyond the colonial
framework established by Britain—the khedive had to meet with the British
court first as a symbolic gesture of who was truly in power in Egypt. Italy had
no place in Britain’s imperial plans and thus could not take the attention of the
British-backed khedive. De Martino lamented this turn of events, writing that
“the planned visit had an undeniable moral importance, and it was a reaffirmation
of Italy’s moral position in Egypt—a distinguished status that must be maintained
for the sake of our traditions in this country and in the interest of our businesses
and our colony.”31 The visit would have reinforced Italian-Egyptian ties,
promoting Italy’s image as an impartial, benevolent European power that stood
outside the British colonial structure, which would in turn both bolster Egyptian
public opinion of the local Italian colony and help create consent among the
Italian-Egyptians regarding the impending Libyan undertaking. Italy’s position
as a colony-within-a-colony, however, severely limited what diplomatic policies it
could undertake, as Britain remained the predominant European power in Egypt.
30. De Martino to San Giuliano, see n. 29.
31. Ibid.
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In both of the previous examples, Britain was a passive actor; Italy
exercised self-restraint because of their fear of going against British desires
and thus compromising the delicate situation of their colony within British
Egypt. One final example demonstrates that this was not always the case.
Britain understood well that Italy was in a precarious position and at times took
advantage of their political supremacy to force Italy’s hand in Egypt. While Italy
had substantial influence in the Mediterranean Basin and the Red Sea Coast
in East Africa, it lacked emigrant colonies and official diplomatic presence in
the remainder of Africa. In February 1910 the Italian military attaché to British
Sudan, Cav. Rossetti, floated the idea of building an official Italian consulate
in Khartoum to Reginald Wingate, the governor-general of Sudan. Sensing
an opportunity, Wingate accepted Rossetti’s proposal, on the condition that
Italy first recognize and ratify the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 189932—the
treaty that established the controversial Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in Sudan
and which granted Britain de facto and de jure rights to govern Sudan almost
independently, uninhibited by interference from other European powers.33 While
the Anglo-Egyptian agreement had already been in place for eleven years, many
European nations with interests in Egypt and the rest of the Ottoman Empire,
including Italy, hesitated to ratify it, worried of the consequences that would
follow their outright support of British expansion.
Rossetti conveyed this possible deal to De Martino and then-foreign
minister Francesco Guicciardini, San Giuliano’s outgoing predecessor, who
32. De Martino to Guicciardini, letter, 258/102, Mar. 2, 1910, in DDI IV, 165–67 (no. 151).
33. Randolph Gherson, “The Anglo-Egyptian Question,” Middle East Journal 7, no. 4
(1953): 456–483, 463–464.
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both ardently rejected Rossetti’s idea. De Martino understood that Egyptian
public opinion, especially the rising nationalist movement, cared deeply
about the political future of Sudan. Any recognition of the 1899 agreement
“would inevitably be interpreted as Italian acquiescence to British power,”
and that as a result, such an endorsement “would produce a hostile, and even
damaging, impression towards our moral position and our plans of influence in
Egypt… including our prosperous colonies.”34 San Giuliano, who had just taken
Guicciardini’s post, agreed, stating that caving to these British demands would
“hurt Italy’s material and moral interests, especially for the Italians residing in
Egypt.”35 The issue of the Italian consulate in Sudan was quickly dropped.
A consulate in Sudan would have been beneficial; it can be assumed that
Rossetti’s initial proposition was likely not simply a rogue, off-the-cuff idea, but
one that was influenced by a larger Italian strategy. Somalia and Eritrea were
far removed from Egypt and Libya, where Italy had dedicated considerable
political and economic capital to furtively spread its agenda of cultural and moral
superiority. Having an increased Italian presence in Khartoum would help bridge
the wide land gap between the Horn of Africa and Egypt, thus geographically
unifying all of Italy’s emigrant and direct colonies. The British clearly understood
this as well, evidenced by their offer of consulate real estate in exchange for
Italian recognition of the unpopular Anglo-Egyptian agreement. Britain attempted
to use their power to compel Italy into submitting to British colonial order
and Italy, limited in its bargaining power by the fear of losing their moral and
34. De Martino to Guicciardini, see n. 32.
35. San Giuliano to De Martino, letter, 25, Apr. 7, 1910, in DDI IV, 213–14 (no. 203).
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cultural prominence in Egypt, was thus forced to change its Sudanese strategy.
In all three of the aforementioned cases Italy’s intended goals were stymied
by British interests. Italy was thus limited in its ability to directly influence the
Egyptian public through diplomatic channels, as Britain more or less controlled
the khedival throne. However, because of the commercial infrastructure of their
Italian colony, the foreign ministry was able to partially circumvent the British
colonial organization through the use of the press.
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Chapter 4
Italy and the Press
In June 1911, Sheikh Ali Ahmed al-Girgawy and Mohammed Amin established
a new newspaper in Cairo: al-Irshad. Amin, a former railway commissioner and
son of a wealthy Egyptian man, possessed enough capital to purchase a printing
press, lease a building, and finance the endeavor, and subsequently became
al-Irshad’s self-nominated administrator. Although little else is known about
him, according to the Italian embassy al-Girgawy provided some of the paper’s
ideological and editorial voice as the primary founder.1
The paper was written in Arabic and had a pronounced nationalist tone
and agenda. One author, writing under the pseudonym Abou Galambo, was most
likely Amin Omar al-Baghoury,2 a former editor of Misr al-Fatat, which was a well
known and powerful Egyptian nationalist organization. Another contributor to
the paper was Sayed Ali, a friend of al-Baghoury and former editor of al-Liwa,
one of the earliest nationalist papers in Egypt. Ali was a politico known for his
aggressive, and at times violent, opinions and reporting.3
1. Grimani to San Giuliano, letter, 1131/402, June 24, 1911, Archivio Storico Diplomatico,
Ambasciata al Cairo collection, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma (henceforth cited as ASDMAE
AC), 124:1911, 4.
2. Summary and analysis of al-Irshad, report, June 24, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 1911:124, 1.
3. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 1, 4.
Al-Irshad, albeit well-financed and fully staffed, never managed to
distribute any issues. Its first edition was seized by Egyptian authorities because
the paper had failed to obtain proper legal authorization—rather, was outrightly
denied permission—under the Egyptian press law of 1881. As part of its militant
nationalist agenda, al-Irshad openly flaunted the fact that it attempted to publish
in the face of government restrictions.4 Nevertheless, while al-Irshad’s boasted
breach of law prevented the actual delivery of the paper, the business apparatus
of the paper was not closed immediately. The paper remained in a sort of legal
limbo for months after the initial closure due to a peculiar, but not uncommon,
legal technicality.
While Amin’s financial assets were most likely sufficient to cover the costs
of the Egyptian nationalist paper, al-Irshad’s official legal owner and financier
was an Italian man named Luigi Pignatin. Because Pignatin, a foreigner, was
involved with the paper, al-Irshad was not beholden to Egyptian press laws—only
the Italian foreign ministry and the local mixed courts could make any legal move
against it. However, since the paper was run by Egyptians, the Italian foreign
ministry was hesitant to launch any suit against it, fearing any damage to Italian
reputation in Egypt.5 Pignatin admittedly “didn’t understand a word” of Arabic,
did not give any money to the paper, and stated that he was uninterested in what
the paper might print.6 The subsequent flurry of diplomatic, parliamentary, and
4. Summary and analysis of al-Irshad, 2.
5. San Giuliano to Grimani, letter, 1479, Div. 3, Sez. 2, N. 37, Pos. 103, July 15, 1911,
ASDMAE AC, 124:1911, 2.
6. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 1, 2.
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legal maneuvers to shut down “his” paper, provides insight into Italy’s discreet
colonial role in Egypt.
This chapter will examine Italy’s varying strategies of working with the
Egyptian and Italian presses in Cairo before and throughout its invasion of Libya.
Italy’s strategy for working with the presses varied widely. At times, to avoid
implication in complicated legal cases that could compromise what Italy often
perceived as their high moral and cultural position, the Italian government
sought to distance itself from potential controversy. At other times the foreign
ministry and Italian legation in Cairo used the press to launch overt campaigns
of propaganda. In many cases, Italy sought to censure, shut down, or even buy
out newspapers that wrote against Italian policy. Control of the press became
a dynamic behind-the-scenes battleground led by the Italian Foreign Ministry.
While Italian involvement with the press varied in substance and circumstance,
it always had the same scope: (1) build and maintain Italian cultural and political
prestige, and (2) manufacture consent for the Libyan invasion in both the
Egyptian and expatriate Italian communities.
Press laws, Mixed Courts, and Italian embarrassment
In late June 1911, before al-Irshad began printing, Luigi Pignatin visited Count
Grimani, the chargé d’affaires at the Italian embassy in Cairo. His visit was
unexpected, as was the news Pignatin brought. Pignatin related to the count
that several Egyptians had approached him about opening a local newspaper
and establishing Pignatin as the owner. They promised him “certain benefits” in
reward for his participation. Pignatin announced to Grimani that he had decided
61
to back up their enterprise wholeheartedly and that he was already assisting the
Egyptians with their new publication7
A perturbed Grimani confronted Pignatin in an attempt to dissuade him
from continuing with his plans. He explained that the benefits he was promised
were mitigated by the fact that he was “selling his own nationality, placing it
in the service of interests and matters that had no business meddling with,”
and that by doing so, he could cause “irreparable damages” to Italy’s good
international relations and standing in Egypt. On Thursday, June 22, Grimani
called Pignatin back to the embassy for a second meeting with both himself and
the Italian judicial consular officer. The judge warned Pignatin that anything he
wrote, or rather, allowed to be written, would fall under Italian national laws, and
that he “would not hesitate to apply those laws to him.”8 The embassy’s pleas fell
on deaf ears—Pignatin’s only response was that he would “think about it.”9
Two days later, on Saturday, June 24, the Egyptian chief of police visited
the embassy to ask for assistance and advice regarding a criminal case they
sought to open against Pignatin. The first issues of al-Irshad had been printed and
were being stored at Pignatin’s house. Despite the embassy’s anger at Pignatin’s
insistence on working with a renegade Egyptian newspaper, Grimani was legally
constrained to give legal protection to Pignatin because of the mixed court
system, which will be described at greater length shortly. The Egyptian police,
7. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 1, 2.
8. Ibid., 2.
9. Ibid., 3.
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therefore, were unable to take possession of the illegal papers—any Egyptian
move against Pignatin “would have constituted an arbitrary and illegal act.”10
While Egyptian authorities were unable to sequester the newspaper in
Pignatin’s house, by Sunday morning they had successfully confiscated all copies
of al-Irshad by seizing its issues from the newsstands and other local sellers.11
Immediately following the police requisition, Pignatin returned to the embassy in
a panic. He asked Grimani what he should do, but Grimani merely reminded him
of their previous discussions. He stated that since the confiscation had not taken
place inside Pignatin’s home, the Egyptian police had done nothing wrong and
that the embassy would not get involved. He repeated the same threat levied by
the consular judge, declaring that the embassy would examine his case to see if it
fell under Italian legal jurisdiction, and if so, that his case would be prosecuted to
the fullest.12 Pignatin left the embassy alone, having lost all potential Italian legal
and moral support.
Regardless of Grimani’s legal threats, neither the Italian embassy nor the
Egyptian police could do much about Pignatin. Grimani had unofficially charged
Pignatin with ignorantly supporting a foreign newspaper, thus harming Italy’s
international reputation and global relationships, but that was his only crime.
Al-Irshad had not published anything against Italy per se—Pignatin’s wrong lay
in the fact that he put Italian national reputation at risk. The Italian government
could either lend their compatriot’s name (and by extension their national
backing) to the illegal Egyptian nationalist movement, or it could step in and
10. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 1, 3.
11. Ibid., 3.
12. Ibid., 4.
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forcibly shut down the paper, which could be misinterpreted as an anti-nationalist
and anti-Egyptian move.
The Egyptian police became involved after Pignatin allowed the first
issues to be distributed, but their action was merely a temporary stopgap.
Although it was run by Egyptian nationalists like al-Girgawy, al-Baghoury, Sayed
Ali, and Mohammed Amin, Egyptian authorities were unable to fully shut down
al-Irshad because Pignatin was a European. Under Egyptian law, established
under the auspices of the British colonial administration, al-Irshad was thus
considered “Italian” and fell under the jurisdiction of the mixed courts.
The phenomenon of the Egyptian mixed courts created a parallel legal
system for foreigners or institutions with foreign backing. The mixed courts
were originally established in 1876 after an intense process of negotiations,
spearheaded by an Armenian Egyptian politician, Nubar Pasha. Nubar Pasha
recognized a gap in the existing pre-colonial legal system—Egyptians could sue
other Egyptians in local courts while Europeans could bring other Europeans
to court in each country’s respective consular court, but cases involving both
Europeans and Egyptians lacked a distinct legal locus. In cases involving
international parties it was unclear which consular court had full jurisdiction—in
cases involving Egyptians, Europeans were almost universally favored.13 Nubar
Pasha proposed the institution of a mixed court system, which would consist of
a council of both European and Egyptian judges, and would be presided over
by a European on a rotating basis. Under Nubar Pasha’s plan, the mixed courts
13. F. Robert Hunter, Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805–1879: From Household
Government to Modern Bureaucracy (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1984), 174–75.
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would be endowed with the authority to take up ambiguous international cases
and execute their subsequent mandates.14
Nubar Pasha sought to bring the primary antagonists, Khedive Ismaʿil
and the largest European powers, France and Britain, to a consensus in order
to repair what he considered a broken legal system. Ismaʿil was willing to
concede more European judicial power: because the new mixed courts would be
co-chaired by Egyptian judges, they “offered [Egyptians] the prospect of rulings
more favorable than those issued by foreign consuls” in international cases.15 The
European powers were far more reluctant, as they feared a loss in the economic
privileges granted them by the Capitulations, a series of Ottoman laws that gave
special legal and commercial privileges to European powers. Some in the Italian
community in Cairo feared the proposed legal reforms, claiming that they would
destroy the privileged legal position of all foreign colonies in Egypt.16
Eventually, though, the European powers came to see the mixed court
proposal as a possible means of circumventing Ismaʿil’s legal authority. After
nine years Nubar Pasha had gained the consent of 14 European capitulatory
powers, including Italy, who all reluctantly signed a contract for a five-year
provisionary period of mixed court rule,17 thus creating a judiciary system
that was “altogether independent of the existing political regime.”18 After the
preliminary five-year trial period, each capitulatory power was responsible
14. Nathan J. Brown, “The Precarious Life and Slow Death of the Mixed Courts of Egypt,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (Feb. 1993): 33–52, 34–36.
15. Ibid., 35.
16. Jasper Yeates Brinton, The Mixed Courts of Egypt (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1930), 30.
17. Ibid., 41.
18. Ibid., xxiv.
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for renewing its quinquennial contract—failure to do so resulted in temporary
suspension from the court. While bureaucratic delays occasionally obstructed
the renewal process—Italy was suspended for a few days in 1916—19with
rare exceptions, the capitulatory powers continued to renew their mixed
court charters until the agreement to begin phasing out the mixed court and
capitulatory system in 1937.
While each European power gave continuing consent for the mixed courts,
their support was at best tenuous—the mixed courts in reality “were constantly
threatened with abolition and lived precariously throughout their history,”20 and
powers often threatened to withhold their renewal as they bargained to secure
future legal privileges.21 While the mixed courts did provide the capitulatory
powers with some loopholes in dealing with Egyptian cases, many of the powers
continued to object to what they perceived as limitations on their capitulatory
rights. As for the Egyptians, Ismaʿil quickly realized that the courts had actually
empowered the foreign powers, and Egyptian peasants resented the sentiment
that Egyptians became foreigners in their own country;22 the courts became one
of the grievances of the nationalistic 1881–82 ʿUrabi Revolt.23
The British occupation of Egypt following the ʿUrabi Revolt further
complicated the issue of the mixed courts and their relationship to the
Capitulations. Because so many other European powers had vested economic
19. Brinton, 43.
20. Brown, 34.
21. Byron Cannon, Politics of Law and the Courts of Nineteenth-Century Egypt (Salt Lake
City: University of Utah Press, 1988), 204–5, 210, 215–19.
22. Cole, 65–66.
23. Brown, 34.
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interests in Egypt, the British were hesitant to destroy the capitulatory privileges
in their new Egyptian protectorate. On the other hand, if they themselves
remained subject to the capitulatory mixed courts, they would inherently limit
themselves in their control of Egyptian affairs.24 Rather than resolve this political
and legal quagmire, the British kept an ambivalent policy regarding the mixed
courts. They sought to minimize their own national involvement in the courts
while simultaneously attempting to strengthen the courts, hoping to placate the
less-powerful European powers. Under the new British regime, most European
powers, including Italy, were much more willing to adhere to the mixed courts,
since the courts became “the firmest guarantee”25 of continued capitulatory
privileges under British colonial rule.
After the British occupation of 1882, Italy continued to participate in
the mixed court system as a pseudo-colonial capitulatory power. As explained
in the introduction, while Italy did have a sizable community of expatriates and
emigrants in Egypt, their primary concern and goal was neighboring Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica, or Libya. Egypt served as the backdoor to Libya; the Italian
government sought to prepare and control as much of the future campaign
as possible from Cairo. As part of this strategy, Italy built up its image as a
benevolent center of refined culture, disinterested in the economic subjugation
of Egypt and the rest of the region, while at the same time preparing a campaign
of propaganda to convince the region of the necessity of invading Libya. The
mixed courts presented a dilemma for this Italian strategy. Italy wanted to remain
24. Brown, 36.
25. Ibid., 38.
67
involved with the courts since the system gave them good legal and economic
leverage against Britain and since, as stated previously, the courts guaranteed
Italian capitulatory rights. On the other hand, to many Egyptian observers,
the courts often appeared “as a product of foreign influence in Egypt and a
limitation on Egyptian sovereignty”—some even went as far as to describe them
as a “crime against humanity.”26 Italy was forced to balance its legal endeavors
in the mixed courts between privilege and public opinion. The press was a
particularly vulnerable spot in Italy’s balancing act. Italy wanted to avoid being
associated with the Egyptian nationalist movement, the principal group to use the
mixed courts to circumvent Egyptian law, while also avoiding being seen as an
oppressive colonial power that got involved in the minutiae of closing down native
journalistic endeavors.
By 1911 cases like Pignatin’s were hardly anomalies. Egyptians often
created companies and incorporated newspapers with minimal European
presence to avoid Egyptian prosecution, thus throwing their cases into the
politically fraught mixed courts. The Italian government especially resented
getting involved with such nominal cases, given their undisclosed ambitions for
the direct colonization of Libya. On March 25, 1909, the Italian foreign ministry
sent a verbal note to the Khedival foreign affairs office, declaring that the Italian
embassy would no longer use the mixed courts to prosecute issues regarding
the press, but that instead, the Egyptian press law should be fully applicable to
all “respected newspapers published either in Arabic or European languages”
26. Brown, 33.
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in Egypt.27 The note further proposed that any Italian wishing to establish a
newspaper would need to go through the formalities of registration with the
Egypt bureaucracy, thus disavowing the Italian consulate (and by extension
the potentially embarrassing mixed courts) of all responsibility in dealing with
any renegade publications. Not wanting to lose control over its legitimate press
interests, however, the note included one stipulation: while the Egyptians would
be responsible for enforcing press legislation for the Italian community, it would
be unable to “prevent an Italian publishing a newspaper when its application [is]
supported by the [diplomatic] representative of Italy.”28 In essence, the 1909
verbal note sought to remove Italian responsibility over awkward mixed court
trials while maintaining Italian control over any press endeavors they felt worthy
of Italian support.
In July 1910 Marquis Antonio di San Giuliano, the Italian foreign minister,
submitted the issue of the Egyptian press law and the mixed courts during the
summer parliamentary session. Acting on behalf of the embassy in Egypt, he
brought forth a short piece of legislation consisting of two articles. The first
was procedural—the quinquennial renewal of Italy’s adherence to the mixed
court charter for the period of 1911–1916. The second article, however, was
tendentious. It aimed to give the 1909 verbal note the full backing of Italian
law, proposing that the Italian government would give its consent to apply the
Egyptian press law to Italians living in Egypt.29
27. Nota verbale diretta al Ministero Khediviale degli Affari Esteri dalla Regia Agenzia
Diplomatica d’Italia, handwritten note, Nov. 29, 1909, ASDMAE AC, 124:1911.
28. Ibid.
29. “Disegno di legge,” Camera dei Deputati–Atti Parlamentari No. 589, Legisl. XXIII
— Sess. 1909–10 — Documenti — Disegni di legge e relazioni, draft legislation, July 4, 1910,
ASDMAE AC, 124:1911, 3.
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In the accompanying legislative summary, San Giuliano admitted that
allowing for one Egyptian law to be applied to Italians exceptionally would
concede some measure of capitulatory privilege and could possibly undermine
the future legitimacy of the mixed courts. However, he argued that benefits of
ending the continuing abuses of the press law in the mixed courts outweighed
the potential damages. He held that with the passing of this new law “the
abuses which expose the system of capitulations to not unfounded critiques will
cease, while our colonies in Egypt will face no detriment.”30 Legally established
newspapers would be associated with the Italian consulate while the Egyptian
government would face the task of reining in any dissenting or renegade paper.
The Italian government would no longer need to embroil itself in native (or
partially native) affairs, and could thus continue its strategy of benevolent
pseudo-colonial influence.
The legislation remained locked in parliamentary procedure and debate
until June 1911, and during the intervening months, Italian policies and ambitions
for a Libyan invasion were intensified. A powerful press campaign of propaganda
started in Italy in the early spring of 1911,31 and as will be seen shortly, that
campaign spilled over into the Italian press in Egypt. The fact that the Italian
government wanted to distance itself from potentially embarrassing and
damaging legal cases in dealing with local press cases in the mixed courts just
as the official Italian press campaign was launched is indicative their desire to
retain their perceived positive public opinion. The Egyptian press law was passed
30. See n. 29, 2.
31. Childs, 38, 54.
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in 1881—it was not until 1909, months before the Libyan invasion, that the Italian
government decided to tackle the latent legal embarrassments.
The result of the final vote on the measure shocked the Cairo embassy. On
June 11, 1911 parliament agreed to extend the contract with the mixed courts,
but rejected the proposal to apply Egyptian press laws to Italian citizens.32
Evidently the risks of losing capitulatory privileges outbalanced the impossible
desire of the Italian embassy to only deal with the “good” papers—parliament did
not want to allow for piecemeal exceptions to the mixed court system and only
apply Egyptian laws ad hoc.
The controversy over Pignatin and al-Irshad began only days after the
Italian parliament announced the new legislation, thus stymieing Grimani’s
hopes of remaining transparent and uninvolved in it and future local disputes.
In one letter to Ahmed Heshmat Pasha, the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs
in Alexandria, Grimani complained that while 1909 verbal note had successfully
given the Italian embassy an unofficial legal loophole for several months, the
Italian government had effectively taken it away. Faced with no alternative,
Grimani was forced to apologize and tackle the case, promising Ahmed Heshmat
Pasha that “in order to demonstrate to your Excellency my strong desire to give
all my support to avoid the turmoil and disruption that the newspaper published
by Mr. Pignatin caused, I can assure your Excellency that I will do my best to
convince my citizen to cease to give assistance to the publication of a newspaper
32. Agenzia Telegrafica Italiana, no. 171, telegram, June 11, 1911, ASDMAE AC,
124:1911.
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that could cause prejudice to the maintenance of good relations existing between
our two countries.”33
The earlier Egyptian sequestration of the first issue of al-Irshad directly
from the vendors was only a temporary measure—the paper’s staff remained
organized and continued to work on a second number. San Giuliano ordered
Grimani to take care of the situation as quickly and quietly as possible, confident
that he would “adopt any measures that would reduce further embarrassment.”34
Over the next few weeks, Grimani confronted Pignatin several more times,
demanding that he cease and desist immediately,35 most likely using threats and
arguments similar those used in his first meetings with Pignatin. By July 18, the
situation had been fully resolved without resorting to either the mixed courts or
the Egyptian police. No additional numbers beyond the first were printed.36 San
Giuliano commended Grimani for his “practical results”37—it had taken weeks of
fierce negotiations, and threats, but Grimani was able to avoid an embarrassing
public spectacle in the mixed courts, thereby saving face for official Italian
interests in Egypt.
Enrico Insabato and Il Convito/al-Nadi
Italy’s strategy towards the press was not limited to attempting to remain hidden
and anonymous in controversy. Direct involvement in the local Arab press was
33. Cairo Embassy to Ahmed Heshmat Pasha, letter, 1134, June 28, 1911, ASDMAE AC,
124:1911, 3.
34. San Giuliano to Grimani, see n. 5, 2.
35. Grimani to San Giuliano, letter, 1184/430, July 5, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 124:1911.
36. Ibid., 3367.
37. San Giuliano to Grimani, letter, 1530, Div. 3, Sez. 2, N. 38, Pos. 103, July 18, 1911,
ASDMAE AC, 124:1911.
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another avenue for controlling and influencing public opinion in the lead up
to the invasion of Libya. The Italian government saw Egypt’s central regional
location, bridging North Africa with the Levant, and understood its potential for
geographic political influence. At the turn of the century, Cairo was an influential
center of intellectual discussion and thought, and the Cairene press figured
prominently throughout the region. The influence of the Egyptian press went
far beyond the borders of Egypt; newspapers and other periodicals printed in
Cairo had relatively wide readership in Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Palestine, and
the rest of the Levant. The widespread and dynamic nature of the Egyptian press
made it an ideal means for influencing regional public opinion. It has been noted
that “whoever intended to undertake any action of propaganda or to influence
Arab-Islamic public opinion… found the ideal atmosphere in Egypt. One could
logically assume that once Egyptian public opinion was conquered, the opinion
of other Muslim countries would follow.”38
The Italian government sought to capitalize on the powerful and widely
read Egyptian press as it prepared for its invasion of Libya. For six years
preceding the invasion of Libya, from 1904–1910, the Italian foreign ministry
supported and subsidized a bilingual Italian-Arabic periodical that promoted
Italian commitment to the doctrines and tropes of Islam and attempted to instill
philo-Islamic Italian propaganda into the literate Muslim community throughout
the region. Additionally, the periodical, dually titled Il Convito/al-Nadi,39
levied veiled attacks against British imperialism in Egypt, asserting that the
38. Angelo Scarbel, “Una Rivista Italo-Araba d’Inizio Secolo: an-Nadi (Il Convito),”
Oriente moderno 58 (1978): 51–67, 52.
39. The Banquet/The Crier
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Italian nation was the only true friend of Islam and the only colonial European
nation with “clean hands.”40Il Convito/al-Nadi’s cultural mission was clearly
“intertwined with the imperialist aspirations of its patrons in Rome,”41 and
provides an excellent example of Italy’s use of the press in their strategy of quiet
“peaceful penetration”42 in Libya and the Mediterranean Basin.
The founder and chief editor of Il Convito/al-Nadi was an Italian named
Enrico Insabato. Insabato was born in Bologna in 1878 and in 1900 received a
diploma in colonial medicine and surgery from the École Supérieure de Medécine
Coloniale in Paris.43 In December 1902 he travelled to Cairo to participate in an
international medical congress and planned on staying for two months, but the
congress seems to have simply been a cover to justify his arrival—his name does
not appear on the list of the members of the Italian delegation.44 Insabato instead
remained in Cairo until 1912, working for the Italian government in various
confidential endeavors. In an undated letter, Insabato explained that his goal in
moving to Cairo was to establish a publication that would become “the center
of all politically natured information and initiatives that could not be associated
with the Royal Legation in Cairo,”45 and that since Cairo, in his estimation, was
“the brain of the whole Muslim world,”46 it would provide an ideal location for
his quasi-diplomatic publication to become a regional political tool. Despite this
40. Scarbel, 59.
41. Meir Hatina, “Where East Meets West: Sufism, Cultural Rapprochement, and
Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 3 (Aug. 2007): 389–409, 394.
42. Grange, II:1390.
43. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 33.
44. Ibid., 34, see footnote 7.
45. Carlo Gotti Porcinari, Rapporti Italo-Arabi (1902–1930) dai documenti di Enrico
Insabato (Roma: E. S. P., 1965), 17.
46. Ibid., 17.
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mission of creating a semi clandestine outlet for Italian diplomatic endeavors,
Insabato often insisted on his own autonomy.47 He insisted that he himself had
proposed the idea of establishing a journal in Cairo to Prime Minister Giolitti;48
whether or not this is the case is impossible to tell.
Upon arriving in Egypt Insabato formed a close friendship with Abd
al-Hadi al-Maghrabi, a Swedish artist, self taught orientalist, and polymath.
Originally named Ivan Aguéli, as a result of his studies Abd al-Hadi became
fascinated with Sufism and converted to Islam while in Egypt. Abd al-Hadi
dreamed of creating “friendship and active collaboration between his native
homeland, the West, and his chosen homeland, the Islamic East.”49 Both Insabato
and the Italian ministry of foreign affairs shared similar ambitions, albeit less
idealistic and more politically motivated. In December 1902, days after arriving in
Cairo, Insabato and Abd al-Hadi established Il Commercio Italiano, a newspaper
dedicated primarily to Italy’s commercial connections and activity in the Middle
East, with some articles exploring Italy’s relationship with Islam.50 In 1904
Insabato and Abd al-Hadi began to further develop their pro-Islamic themes and
thus transformed Il Commercio Italiano to Il Convito/al-Nadi, published in both
Italian and Arabic.
Il Convito/al-Nadi was not a simple bilingual publication with translated
articles mirroring each other. The Arabic language section of the periodical
was not limited to the translation of the Italian half—Muslim writers such as
47. Scarbel, 53.
48. Porcinari, 17.
49. Scarbel, 54.
50. Hatina, 392; Scarbel, 54.
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Mohammed Sharbatli and Yusuf Kamil al-Bukhari regularly contributed.51
Both halves of the periodical pursued related editorial interests. Further, Il
Convito/al-Nadi’s subtitle declared that it was an “italo-islamico” periodical,
which entailed that its intended audience was much larger than the Arabic
speaking Middle East;52 Abd al-Hadi and Insabato (and by extension the Italian
government) sought to engage the global Muslim community, or ʾumma. Il
Convito/al-Nadi ambitiously sought to become a “guide to cultural harmony”
between the two cultures,53 fulfilling Abd al-Hadi’s goal of bridging the gap
between East and West, with Italy as the impartial and fair European mediator.
Il Convito/al-Nadi was initially published daily, with two pages in Italian
and two in Arabic, and in mid-1904 two pages in Ottoman Turkish were added,
paving the way for much wider readership throughout the Ottoman Empire.54
For the first half of its existence, from 1904 to mid-1907, Il Convito/al-Nadi
emphasized two primary themes: the legacy of civility between Italy and the
Ottoman empire, and the longstanding Italian respect for Islam.55
Insabato introduces all these themes in his first editorial, published in the
paper’s inaugural edition on May 22, 1904. He explains that when he arrived in
Cairo, “that Orient that I had so longed to see,” he immediately recognized that
contrary to European prejudices condemning Islam as ignorant and an “enemy of
human progress,” Islam actually had enormous “civilizing potential.”56 He then
51. Scarbel, 57.
52. Ibid., 56.
53. Hatina, 393.
54. Scarbel, 56.
55. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 41.
56. Enrico Insabato, Il Convito/al-Nadi, May 22, 1904.
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states that the Islamic world is split into two binary worlds. The first, which he
calls “the people of the mosque,” represents those Muslims who practice their
religion and conform to the Sunna, or traditional doctrinal Islamic practices.
These “people of the mosque” are driven by their desire for knowledge and
continually seek to expand their learning and share it with others. These pious
Muslims have been able to adapt natively to changes in society, always using
Islam as their foundation and standard, and thus have built and sustained Islamic
civilization for centuries.
The second half of Muslim society, Insabato continues, is a “mixed,
unsettled, pretentious, and ridiculous world composed of grotesque imitators
of Europe.”57 This world is composed of and lead by a growing movement of
Muslim scholars who had been influenced by European intellectuals—a rising
class of native intelligentsia that intended to use reformed Islam as a model for
European-style modernization. These scholars had accepted those prejudices that
Europe had projected in the region through their imperialist endeavors, believing
that the modern incarnation of Islam was the primary obstacle to progress and
true modernization. One of these scholars, Jurji Zaydan, a Lebanese Christian
in Egypt, was responsible for producing the history curriculum for government
schools in the late nineteenth century. In his textbooks he stated that Islamic
civilization achieved its apex during the reign of the first four Rightly Guided
caliphs in the years immediately following Mohammed the Prophet’s death, and
that ever since, Islamic culture had been in steady decline.58 Because of the
57. Insabato, see n. 56.
58. Mitchell, 169.
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backwardness of Islam, Islamic societies had “not properly followed the laws of
social development,” and therefore needed to imitate Europe, which offered the
only unilinear path to modernization.59 For Insabato, the proposed reforms of
these Muslims, who adhered to Islam “in name only,” aimed to distort the very
core of Islam, creating a type of “Protestantism in tarboosh”—that is, a soulless
European shell of intellectualism and modernity.60
Insabato concludes that, rather than this distorted idea of
European-inspired Islamic reform, “pure Islam, the foundation of Arab
civilization, is absolutely indispensable for true progress in the Orient.”61 He
states that “we do not consider the Orient to be a backward or untamed region…
rather we see it as a land of immense intellectual and moral resources, only
temporarily disorganized, that can easily lift itself up again by calling upon its
latent potential.”62 His goal, then, is to break with the rising current of reform
and instead “demonstrate to Europe true Islam” and its civilizing potential,
while reciprocally “revealing to Muslims the true Europe,”63 and thus redeem
European intellectualism, which had been convoluted with the reform movements
he so derided.
Insabato discreetly poses Italy as the mediator between Islam and Europe.
The “people of the mosque,” in his view, were pure and intellectually undefiled,
ready to carry the burden of modernization and adaptation in the twentieth
century; on the other hand, the second half of Islamic society, the reformers
59. Mitchell, 169–170.
60. Insabato, see n. 56.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
78
inspired by Europe, sought to destroy Islam. Other European powers were unable
to stand in between the two parties, especially Britain and France, who had long
pursued their colonial interests in Egypt and who had created this new cohort of
reformists. Only an Italian, an outside observer and an ardent admirer of “true”
Islam, could bridge this gap.
Subsequent issues of Il Convito/al-Nadi continued to develop this
philo-Islamic theme. Articles and editorials were published regarding Italy and
its assistance of Muslims, Italy and Islam, the nobility of Islam, the grandness
of Islam, and numerous other topics.64 Insabato and Abd al-Hadi argued that
since “all peoples stem from a single source… their sole goal is to advance
enlightenment and morality.… The strong have a duty to display sympathy for
the weak instead of stealing their land and usurping their freedom.”65 In their
view, “European powers [had] failed in this lofty mission, but not Italy.”66 Italy
understood the importance and power of “pure Islam” and was therefore devoid
of any prejudice to the Muslim world.
In May 1907 Il Convito/al-Nadi eliminated the Turkish section and
switched to a monthly format, printing substantially larger issues. While his
articles and editorials continued to promote pro-Italian philo-Islamic ideals,
Insabato intensified his condemnation of other European colonial powers, arguing
that the great European powers failed to understand or respect Islam.67 The
64. See Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 40 for a full list of principal themes.
65. Hatina, 393.
66. Ibid., 393.
67. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 41.
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continuing anti-British critiques eventually caused Lord Cromer, the British
Consul-General, to deport Insabato temporarily.68
Beyond the ongoing concern of Italy’s innocent and honorable relationship
with the Muslim world, the writers of Il Convito/al-Nadi also repeatedly
emphasized of two aspects of Islamic culture: (1) scholastic and legal issues, and
(2) mystical Sufism.69 Il Convito/al-Nadi addressed the status of the Ottoman
caliphate in 1906 and stated that it was incumbent upon all Muslims, worldwide,
to obey the caliph, Sultan Abdülhamid II. Insabato advocated for a type of
federative pan-Islamic ʾumma, presided over by Abülhamid’s Ottoman dynasty,
and backed up his conclusions using Islamic legal arguments and tradition.70
Apart from the support of the caliphate, Il Convito/al-Nadi also advocated
for the full restoration of Islamic shariʿa law, which was described as “one of
the loftiest judicial systems in the world, typified by legal flexibility and founded
on the principles of justice and liberty. It alone could uproot the manifestations
of crime and corruption in society and strengthen internal unity.”71 In keeping
with Insabato’s negative view of Western intellectualism in the region, the paper
criticized the Ottoman Empire for abandoning shariʿa for Western legal codes,
“which only obstruct[ed] justice.”72
While these calls for the application of Islamic law and for the
continuation of the caliphate fit into Insabato’s stated goals of promoting
a nativistic “pure Islam,” there was a hidden political agenda behind the
68. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 42.
69. Hatina, 394.
70. Ibid., 393.
71. Ibid., 394.
72. Ibid., 394.
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philo-Islamic decrees. A federated and diffused Islamic social system, loyal to
a symbolic caliph, could serve two political goals. By encouraging all Muslims
to reaffirm their loyalties to the Ottoman sultan, including those Muslims in
British and French controlled regions near Istanbul, such as Syria and Palestine,
where nascent nationalist and anti-Ottoman movements were gaining strength,
the paper sought to undermine British and French imperialist ambitions, as
these colonial powers sought to dismantle and decentralize the troubled empire
in order to further their own colonialist and economic plans. Additionally,
less-centralized and more federated loyalty to a distant caliph would leave the
further-removed Mediterranean basin (especially Libya) more open for the
establishment of a lasting Italian colonial presence.73
Il Convito/al-Nadi also repeatedly addressed topics related to Sufism—a
logical editorial choice considering Abd al-Hadi’s involvement with the paper.
According to the Muslim contributors to the paper, Sufism was the true driving
force behind Insabato’s proposed anti-Western, nativist intellectual revival, as
it “provid[ed] individuals with inner strength and act[ed] as an important lever
to reinforce social solidarity,” and had a long history of intellectual openness.74
The Muslim writers of Il Convito/al-Nadi concluded that it was only through the
acceptance of the pure doctrines of Sufism that West and East could be truly
bridged.75
While these spiritual pronouncements may appear to be genuinely
motivated underlying political motivations are evident. The paper’s philo-Islamic
73. Hatina, 394.
74. Ibid., 394.
75. Ibid., 396.
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emphasis on Sufism can actually be understood as a veiled attack on the
British. Il Convito/al-Nadi sought to use Sufi intellectualism to create a new
class of Muslim scholars that would lead the much hoped-for native process
of modernization and adaptation, thus replacing the new British-inspired
intelligentsia that stood against Insabato’s idea of “pure Islam.” Moreover, the
paper’s preoccupation with Sufism furthered Italy’s rising regional imperialist
ambitions. Italy had its sights set squarely on Libya, where the Senussiya, a
powerful Sufi brotherhood, held tremendous sway in local politics. As early as
1903, Insabato already had plans for building up an Italian-Senussi relationship,
stating that because the Senussiya was predominant in Tripolitania and Somalia
(already under semi-colonial Italian control), “we can enter into agreements
with [the Senussis] in case of occupation or colonization in Tripolitania.”76 At its
highest point, Il Convito/al-Nadi had a readership of 5,000 and was distributed
across the Middle East and the Islamic world (Insabato even claimed there were
readers as far away as Japan77). Italian Prime Minister Giolitti made special care
that the paper was distributed in Libya, precisely “to spread Italian influence… in
Tripolitania.”78
Il Convito/al-Nadi’s pan-Islamic, anti-imperialist, anti-British, pro-Ottoman,
pro-Italy, and pro-Sufi agenda, published in both Italian and Arabic, was
read throughout Egypt, Libya, and the region in the years preceding Italy’s
own imperial invasion of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The paper targeted
two audiences: Arabic-speaking Muslims and Italian-speaking intellectuals
76. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 36.
77. Porcinari, 17.
78. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 38.
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and expatriates in Egypt. Il Convito/al-Nadi’s cultural mission was clearly
“intertwined with the imperialist aspirations of its patrons in Rome,”79 and
“served as a springboard for Italy’s [colonial] entrenchment in the region”80 as
it attempted to both manufacture consent for the future Libyan invasion and
bolster Italian cultural and political prestige among the Muslim world and Italian
expatriates in Egypt.
Censorship to directly suppress dissent
The official invasion of Libya started on September 29, 1911. Once the war
began, Italy largely dropped its pretenses of benign colonial ambition, especially
as battlefront reports filled the Arabic-language Cairene newspapers. Publication
of Il Convito/al-Nadi had ceased a year previously, and the delicate legislative
and diplomatic dance over the application of the Egyptian press law in the mixed
courts was forgotten. The Italian government turned all its interests to the
ongoing war, and Egypt remained a critical battleground over public opinion.
While other philo-Islamic initiatives in Egypt, which will be discussed in the
following chapter, continued throughout the war, Italian policy towards the
press in particular shifted from subliminal influence to a much more aggressive
strategy of censure, acquisition, and closure as part of a larger military strategy.
Italy’s quest to control or silence dissident newspapers in Egypt served to
decrease the effectiveness and morale of the Libyan insurgency, and to limit the
79. Hatina, 394.
80. Ibid., 396.
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spread of negative public opinion among Egyptians and the Italian community in
Egypt.
As discussed previously, the Cairene press had wide readership
throughout the region and during the war, Egyptian newspapers were shipped
to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, where they were distributed among the Libyan
resistance and general population.81 Many Egyptian papers were hostile to Italy
throughout the war; Al-Mahrousa was particularly vehement. Beyond its standard
battlefield reports, Al-Mahrousa regularly published pro-Islamic articles that
sought to incite anti-Italian sentiments and swell the numbers of the volunteer
mujahideen force in Libya. On October 4, 1911, only a week after the official start
of the war, Al-Mahrousa reported that Muslims as far away as India had pledged
their full support, and some even their services as volunteers, against Italy.82
As the war continued, anti-Italian government articles became a regular
feature.83 Al-Mahrousa regularly published emotional poetry written by
Muhammed Mustafa al-Islambouli, Muhammed Ahmed Ghayth, and Muhammed
Ramzy Naziim, praising the Ottoman regiments in Libya,84 commending the
mujahideen,85 and harshly criticizing the war and the Italians in general.86
Other newspapers followed similar agendas. Al-Muqattam reported several
81. Grimani to San Giuliano, letter, Agenzia Diplomatica, 2013/752, Nov. 17, 1911,
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anti-Italian demonstrations in Mahalla, Alexandria, and Cairo in November
1911,87 often emphasized Italy’s military incompetence,88 and like Al-Mahrousa,
published several anti-Italian, pro-Ottoman poems by Muhammed Emad and
Khalil Mutran.89
In November 1911, six weeks after the invasion, Count Grimani sent a
wire to San Giuliano, complaining that it had almost become a competition among
the Egyptian newspapers to write the most hostile articles against Italy. He wrote
that “the most widespread journals are those that demonstrate Italy as hostile
and Turkey as victorious.” Even those papers that were initially pro-Italy had
begun to turn. One, al-Jarida, “was initially favorable to [Italy], but after seeing
a reduction in readership, changed its language and standpoint and was once
again held in high esteem [among Egyptians].”90 Italy’s hard-fought prestige in
Egypt was quickly waning, putting the Italian community at risk. Additionally,
this negative press had wide readership in Libya and threatened to undermine
the ongoing Italian military operation.
To reduce the spread of anti-Italian publications in Libya, and secure
Italian interests in Egypt, Grimani proposed gaining more direct control over the
Cairene press and raised the possibility of funding a pro-Italy Arabic-language
newspaper. Grimani suggested that rather than found a new publication ex
nihilo, the foreign ministry could subsidize and control an already extant paper.
87. “Muẓāharāt fī al-Maḥalla taʾayyedan lil-dawla al-ʾuthmāniyya,” Al-Muqattam, Oct. 7,
1911; “Muẓāharāt al-ʾAskandariyya,” Al-Muqattam, Nov. 4, 1911; “Muẓāharāt thāniyya fī
al-ʾAskandariyya,” Al-Muqattam, Nov. 6, 1911.
88. “ʿAjaz Iṭālīa al-ẓāhir,” Al-Muqattam, June 2, 1912.
89. Mohammed Emad, “ʾUsṭūl Iṭāliā,” Al-Muqattam, Jan. 12, 1912; Khalil Mutran, “ʿEtāb
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He nominated al-Akhbar as the paper most appropriate for this strategy, as
it was owned by Sheikh Youssef al-Khazen, a Syrian Egyptian who “could be
trusted” with this special mission.91 He recommended that Italy purchase
forty subscriptions to the paper and then distribute those issues in Tripoli to
“demonstrate to the [Libyans] that our endeavor is not detested by everyone [in
Egypt].”92 If, following this trial period of subscription, al-Akhbar succeeded in
delivering consistent pro-Italian coverage, it could eventually be purchased by
the government and potentially be relocated to Tripoli.
An ambitious budget was then proposed, which included provisions
for the construction in Tripoli of a printing press, typography, and adjunct
cultural library, which would transform the relocated al-Akhbar into a bilingual
Arabic-Italian newspaper.93 The initial trial progressed well and on December 31,
1911, General Caneva, commander of the Italian expeditionary corps in Libya,
expanded the evaluation, increasing the number of subscriptions to al-Akhbar to
150, specifying that 75 be distributed in Tripoli, 15 in Homs, 25 in Bengasi, 20
in Derna, and 15 in Tobruk, in order to maximize distribution across Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica.94 Hedging their bets, the Italians also gave money to another
Egyptian newspaper, al-Omran, and purchased 100 subscriptions to distribute in
Libya.95
91. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 81, 1.
92. Ibid., 2.
93. Abi Rascid to San Giuliano, handwritten proposal, 92994, Dec. 7, 1911, ACS:PCM,
1912 T 11, 1–6.
94. Ministro di Guerra to Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, letter, Ministero della
Guerra, 14526, Dec. 31, 1911, ACS:PCM, 1912 T 11.
95. Ministro di Guerra to Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, letter, Ministero della
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In February 1912, General Caneva ordered that both al-Omran and
al-Akhbar cease to be distributed in Libya, alleging that “while they publish
favorable articles about Italy every once in a while, they publish many others
decidedly against [the war].”96 He concluded that it would be dangerous allowing
continued circulation of these newspapers Libya, especially since the Italian
army itself was the primary importer and distributor, having purchased hundreds
of subscriptions months earlier. It seems that although both papers received
Italian subsidies, the temptation to join al-Muqattam, al-Mahrousa, and the other
Egyptian papers in anti-Italian rhetoric was strong.
In March 1912, Prime Minister Giolitti proposed that the foreign ministry
begin the process of relocating al-Akhbar to Tripoli.97 In the meantime, the paper
continued to publish in Egypt its vacillating opinions and reports of the war.
Giolitti’s plan to move al-Akhbar received an unexpected push in May, after the
khedive applied the Egyptian press law and ordered the closure of several Cairo
newspapers, among which was al-Akhbar, which had recently published an article
critical of the regime.98 Having lost the only Egyptian newspaper that gave any
positive coverage of the war, Grimani proposed that Italy either establish a new
newspaper under the direction of the newly unemployed Youssef al-Khazen,99
in Egypt, or, as part of the original plan, create a new pro-Italian paper in
Tripoli itself. However, the plan was soon abandoned. The costs of relocating
96. C. Caneva to Ministro di Guerra, letter, Comando del Corpo di Spedizione in
Tripolitania e Cirenaica, 1166, Feb. 24, 1912, ACS:PCM, 1912 T 11.
97. Ministro di Guerra to Giolitti, letter, Ministero della Guerra, 6555, Apr. 17, 1912,
ACS:PCM, 1912 T 11.
98. Grimani to San Giuliano, letter, Agenzia Diplomatica, 1119/405, 43325, May 22, 1912,
ACS:PCM, 1912 T 11, 1.
99. Ibid., 2.
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the paper to Tripoli or using al-Khazen to establish a new paper in Cairo were
prohibitive, despite the allocated budget, and the political ramifications of
creating a blatantly pro-Italian Arabic newspaper in Cairo were too inconvenient
and risky.100 Having effectively lost al-Akhbar, as fickle an ally as it was, the
foreign ministry was left with only one option—find new Egyptian publications
to support. This policy of press bribery continued until the end of the war in
December 1912 and on into the ensuing colonial occupation of Libya,101 and Italy
was never able to outrightly and exclusively finance an Arabic-language Egyptian
newspaper.
By subsidizing, bribing, and even planning to take over elements of the
Egyptian press, Italy sought to instill doubt in and undermine the confidence of
the Libyan resistance and insurgency, which regularly consumed and distributed
the pro-Ottoman, pro-Islamic, anti-Italian literature coming out of Cairo.
Furthermore, Italy hoped to bolster and maintain the waning support of their
community in Egypt. Positive press coverage provided an avenue to counter the
constant stream of anti-Italian invective assailing, which, as will be discussed in
the next chapter, often outrightly rejected and protested against the war.
Italy pursued varying strategies and policies when working with the
Egyptian and Italian press in Cairo before and during Italy’s war in Libya,
from 1901 to 1912. Initially, in the decade before the invasion, Italy sought to
portray itself as a benevolent, philo-Islamic nation that had few, if any, colonial
100. San Giuliano to Giolitti, letter, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 491, June 10, 1912,
ACS:PCM, 1912 T 11, 1.
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ambitions in the region. This image served as a cover for larger Italian imperial
ambitions and attempted to convince Italians and Egyptians (and by nature of
Cairo’s central location, the rest of the Islamic world) of the benevolence of
Italy’s involvement in Libya. At times, the Italian foreign ministry and embassy
attempted to remain unseen during potentially embarrassing legal issues
regarding the press, such as Luigi Pignatin and al-Irshad, opting to sacrifice their
capitulatory rights for the ability to remain unconnected with petty legal issues
that could damage Italian prestige.
At other times, Italy sought to project their philo-Islamic agenda through
the press, launching veiled attacks on imported British intellectualism among
the rising Muslim intelligentsia, and portraying Italy as a friend to the worldwide
community of Muslims. Additionally, by addressing the importance of Sufi
intellectualism, Enrico Insabato’s Il Convito/al-Nadi attempted to garner support
among its readers in Libya, where the Senussiya held considerable power, and
would see Italy as a benign European supporter of “pure Islam.” Once the war
began, Italy shifted its role as an outsider in the influential Cairene press and
attempted to bribe and control different papers to ensure that a positive voice
was heard among the streams of criticism and protest. These varying attitudes
towards the Egyptian and Italian press in Cairo always aimed at building and
maintaining Italian cultural prestige with the purpose of manufacturing consent
for the invasion among the Egyptians and the expatriate Italian mutamassirun.
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Chapter 5
Manufactured Consent?
One critical aspect of Italy’s policy of pénétration pacifique into Libya was
the portrayal of Italy as a noble philo-Islamic nation, uninterested in imperial
expansion in the Muslim world and genuinely concerned about the future of
Islam in a modern world. By undertaking this campaign of propaganda, the
foreign ministry hoped to convince the general Egyptian population that Italy
could be trusted as a European power. This trust would then be understood as
implicit consent and support from Egypt for the invasion of Libya. For many
Egyptians, however, Italy’s strategy of manufacturing consent was readily seen as
a simple deception. Before the invasion, the Egyptian front of Italy’s philo-Islamic
campaign was met with cynicism and distrust which transformed itself into open
hostility following the outbreak of the war.
The other facet of Italy’s strategy in Egypt in the decade prior to its
imperial invasion and occupation of Libya was to build italianità within the Italian
communities, or colonies, in Egypt. As previously discussed, the multiethnic and
cosmopolitan nature of Cairo’s and Alexandria’s bifurcated geography helped to
create feelings of mutamassiriyya among the expatriate European communities.
Thanks to economic and legal privileges such as the Capitulations and the
Mixed Courts, many emigrant Italians found economic success in Egypt and felt
themselves deeply connected to Egyptian society. The Italian foreign ministry
used its campaign of pénétration pacifique to project an image of imperial
benevolence in order to build national pride among the Italian mutamassirun
and to manufacture consent for the eventual invasion of Libya. While Italy’s
efforts to persuade Egyptians to support the ongoing invasion largely failed, the
foreign ministry was initially successful in maintaining consensus and Italian
patriotism in the Italian mutamassir communities. However, as the war dragged
on, community and association leaders began to drop their support and lead their
own anti-Italian government protests.
Egyptian skepticism and cynicism
While the press campaign discussed in the previous chapter served the dual
purpose of convincing both the Egyptian and the Italian communities that Italy
was benevolent and non-imperial and that an eventual Libyan invasion would
only have positive outcomes, the Italian foreign ministry pursued several other
strategies aimed solely at improving relations in the Islamic world. As we have
seen, Enrico Insabato, the paid agent of the foreign ministry and the publisher
of Il Convito/al-Nadi, spearheaded the primary philo-Islamic campaign. Upon
his arrival in Cairo in 1901, Insabato drafted a list of various recommendations
promoting philo-Islamic policies, which included working with the Italian
community to establish an Italian school for Egyptians alone, the creation of
an Arabic-Italian periodical that could be read throughout the Muslim world (Il
Convito/al-Nadi satisfied this recommendation in 1904), instituting Islamic shariʿa
law in Italy’s East African colonies in order to abolish slavery, the construction
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of a mosque in Rome, and the institution of various Italian businesses to aid in
the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca.1 One of his key proposals was to collaborate with
Sufi brotherhoods, especially the Senussiya, for “it is predominant in Tripolitania
and Somalia, insomuch that at the right moment we can enter into negotiations
with them, in the case of the occupation or colonization of Tripolitania.”2
To build close relations with regional Sufi orders, Insabato worked
with a prominent Egyptian religious leader, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman ʿIlaysh,
one of the founders and regular contributors to Il Convito/al-Nadi. His father,
Muhammed ʿIlaysh, was the shaykh al-Azhar and mufti over the Malaki school
of Islamic jurisprudence, and was the leader of the al-ʿArabiyya al-Shādhiliyya
Sufi fraternity. Additionally, Muhammed ʿIlaysh worked with the Egyptian
proto-nationalist movement and helped organize resistance against the British
during the 1882 ʿUrabi revolt. In July 1882 he joined with several other high
ʿulema and called for Khedive Tawfiq’s deposition from the throne, condemning
him as an apostate for collaborating with Europeans,3 and a few weeks later he
ordered a mob to pull down a statue of Ibrahim Pasha, Tawfiq’s grandfather, in
a central Cairene square.4 As a result of his anti-British actions, he was arrested
during the British military intervention and died in prison a few months later.5
In 1882 his son had himself become a professor at al-Azhar, but because of his
1. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 36–37.
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3. Cole, 247.
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connections to his dissident father, Abd al-Rahman was condemned to a five
year exile in Syria and Istanbul. Upon returning to Egypt, ʿIlaysh presided over
his own Sufi order—the same order that Abd al-Hadi al-Maghrabi (the Swedish
polymath formerly known as Ivan Aguéli) and Insabato later joined.6
ʿIlaysh was hardly the nationalist his father was—he actively collaborated
with Insabato and the Italian government in their philo-Islamic agenda and was
a keystone in Italy’s propaganda campaign. From 1905–06 ʿIlaysh independently
funded and built a small mosque in the al-Azhar quarter, only meters away from
the entrance to the eminent Islamic university, and named it after the king of
Italy.7 By building the Umberto I mosque ʿIlaysh hoped to convey to the ʿulema
the benevolence of Italy. In 1906 he justified his pro-Italy stance, declaring that
“Italy is the only power that can agree with us Muslims, for the Italians are
friendly and treat us fairly, without pride.”8 The foreign ministry agreed to take
responsibility for the maintenance of the Umberto I mosque after its completion,
giving Italy a veritable foothold in the center of Islamic Cairo.
Insabato and the Italian government also worked with ʿIlaysh to make
inroads with the Senussiya, since, as Insabato posited, “partnership with the
Senussiya was critical for Italian cultural and commercial penetration in the
Tripolitanian hinterland.”9 Together with the translator for the Italian consulate
in Cairo, Mohammed Ali Elui Bey, ʿIlaysh and Insabato held secret meetings with
Sidi Mohammed Abed, the brother of the Grand Senussi, Sidi Ahmed, and paid
6. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 42.
7. Ibid., 43.
8. Ugo Ojetti, “Accanto alla vita,” L’Illustrazione Italiana, June 11, 1906, 130–31; cited in
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the Senussi leader thousands of lire in cash and gifts to obtain his support for
Italy.10 Additionally, De Martino, the Italian consul general in Cairo, met secretly
with the khedive to discuss the Egyptian government’s clandestine support of an
Italian-Senussi alliance.11 In a final effort to win over the Senussiya, in January
1912, in the middle of the actual invasion of Libya, Insabato and ʿIlaysh published
an Arabic pamphlet entitled al-Mudawwana al-thahabiyya, or The Golden
Document, and distributed it in both Egypt and Libya as a special supplement to
Il Convito/al-Nadi. The text was the culmination of Italy’s philo-Islamic agenda
in the Arab world and summarized the various activities Italy had undertaken
during the past decade in an attempt to make a final proof of Italy’s benevolence.
Insabato and ʿIlaysh cited passages from the Qur’an and the hadith to prove
to the Islamic world that “the Ottoman sultan did not protect the interests of
Muslims in Tripolitania” and that it was therefore necessary for Italy to “liberate
[Tripolitania’s] people from slavery and from the misdeeds of the Turks.”12
Despite all their efforts, however, Insabato and ʿIlaysh failed to create any
sort of working partnership between the Italian government and the Senussiya.
In fact, the Senussiya brotherhood became one of the primary insurgent forces
in Cyrenaica, and in a highly tenuous alliance (occasionally bordering on civil
war) with the leader of the Tripolitanian resistance, Ramadan al-Suwayhli, the
Sufi order forced an eventual Italian stalemate and won substantial autonomy in
10. Insabato, see n. 9, 32.
11. De Martino to Guicciardini, letter, Riservato 190/75, Feb. 15, 1910, in DDI IV, 132–34
(no. 120), 134.
12. Enrico Insabato, Al-Mudawwana al-thahabiyya (Cairo: n. p., 1912), 3; cited in
Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 65.
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Cyrenaica.13 As early as 1908, Libyans were acutely aware of the dangers posed
by Italian cultural and economic pénétration pacifique, “recalling the European
economic penetration that had preceded the occupations of Tunisia and Egypt.”14
Neither the Italian press campaigns, the distribution of Il Convito/al-Nadi, Italy’s
philo-Islamic posture, nor the investments of Banco di Roma in the Libyan
infrastructure were enough to sufficiently convince Libyan Muslims of Italy’s
benevolence.
Italian policies faced similar disbelief and cynicism in Egypt. In 1907,
five years before the true nature of Italy’s Egypt-based philo-Islamic agenda
was revealed in al-Mudawwana al-thahabiyya, Rashid Rida, the intellectual
leader of the Egypto-Syrian Arabist movement and editor of the journal al-Manār,
criticized ʿIlaysh for his unprecedented audacity in building a mosque dedicated
to a Christian Italian king. Rida accused ʿIlaysh of being on the payroll of the
foreign ministry and that as such, the mosque was illegal according to Islamic
law.15 Later that year, Rida suggested that the Umberto I mosque was merely a
front for Italy’s foreign policy in Egypt.16 When the war began in 1911 popular
Egyptian newspapers attacked ʿIlaysh’s relationship with the Italian government:
in February 1912 al-Mahrousa attacked Enrico Insabato and ʿIlaysh over
al-Mudawwana al-thahabiyya,17 and al-Muqattam followed up with its own exposé
13. Lisa Anderson, “Ramadan al-Suwayhli: Hero of the Libyan Resistance,” chap. 8,
in Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, ed. Edmund Burke, 1st ed. (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993), 123.
14. Ibid., 118.
15. Rashid Rida, “Bidʿa gharība fī Miṣr,” Al-Manār, July 1907, 398–400; cited in
Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 43.
16. Rashid Rida, “Siyāsat īṭāliyā bi-maṭāʿimiha fī bilād al-muslimīna,” Al-Manār, Oct.
1907, 637–38; cited in Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 44.
17. “Al-Shaykh ʿIlaysh,” Al-Maḥrūsa, Feb. 8, 1912; “Matha ʾaṣāb al-shaykh?” Al-Maḥrūsa,
Feb. 19, 1912.
95
of Insabato, ʿIlaysh, and their involvement with the Italian foreign ministry a few
months later.18
In the face of Italy’s ongoing propaganda campaign, and notwithstanding
the Italian government’s repeated attempts at controlling or censuring the
press, Italophobic sentiment grew increasingly more powerful and more violent.
Through populist, and occasionally fabricated, news reports, the Arabic press
helped incite pro-Libyan mobs that rallied against both the Italian government
and the Italian mutamassirun. The first anti-Italian demonstrations started in the
Canal Zone. Egyptian police halted a small riot in Port Said on October 2, 1911
and gave the Italian consulate in Cairo assurances that similar demonstrations
would not happen again. The demonstrations were precipitated by false reports
that the Ottoman military had destroyed the Italian naval fleet in the Aegean Sea.
Grimani speculated that Turkey had intentionally spread the false news in order
to “stir up the Arab population… and to provoke the Italian colonies.”19
Contention continued to rise in Port Said throughout the month. In late
October, several Italian mutamassirun, most likely dock workers, visited the
Café Paradiso. One had a copy of the Corriere della Sera, the leading Italian
newspaper printed in Rome, which had published a photo of captured Arab
leaders forced to kneel in front of the head Italian admiral. A Turkish dock worker
from the Suez Canal Company came into the café, took the paper by his teeth
and ripped it up, causing a scene.20 According to newspaper reports in Port
18. “Nafī al-Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥman ʿIlaysh ʾaw ʾirsālihi ʾilā mustashfā al-mujāthīb,”
Al-Muqattam, July 15, 1912.
19. Grimani to San Giuliano, 1683/642, Oct. 3, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10.
20. Tintoni to Grimani, letter, 1721/2089, Oct. 25, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10, 1.
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Said newspapers La Verité, La Gazzetta di Porto Said e Cairo, and even the
Cairo-based and mutamassir-run L’Imparziale, a violent altercation then ensued
between the Italian workers and the Turks and Egyptians.21 The Italian consul in
Port Said denied any wrongdoing on behalf of the Italian community and accused
the papers of “acting Italophobic because they were bought off by some Egyptian
bey.”22
Anti-Italian protests exploded in Alexandria the following week as the first
reports of Italian losses trickled out of Libya. On October 23 the 11th Bersaglieri
regiment was attacked by a force of Ottoman regulars and Arab irregulars (most
likely with volunteers from Egypt) in the outskirts of Libya, near Shar al-Shatt.
The confrontation, also known as the Battle of al-Hani, left over 500 Italians
dead and effectively disabled the Italian division.23 Days later an Arab uprising
occurred in Tripoli itself, a surprise to the Italian forces who expected to be
greeted as liberators. In retaliation for both the defeat at the Battle of al-Hani
and the subsequent uprising, the military ordered a massacre, and on October 26,
“the Italians had killed all the inhabitants of an entire quarter [of Tripoli], women
and children included.”24
The response to both the Italian defeat, as well as the massacre in Tripoli,
was vehemently Italophobic in Egypt. On the morning of October 31 Egyptian
newspapers al-ʿAlam and Wadi al-Nil reported the “complete destruction of the
Italians at Tripoli, and the loss of all its artillery, and the flight and retreat of
21. Tintoni to Grimani, see n. 20, 2.
22. Ibid., 1.
23. Childs, 86.
24. Ibid., 86.
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General Caneva [the commanding officer for the expedition],”25 and by two
o’clock that afternoon thousands of pamphlets had been printed and distributed
announcing “the brilliant victory of the glorious Ottoman armies.”26 Later that
afternoon a large mob moved through the city, threatening and insulting Italians
and other mutamassir Europeans. By nine o’clock the rioters had swelled in
numbers as they shattered the windows of various mutamassir Italian, Greek,
and Armenian shops and residences, and several Greek stores were looted.27
The police proved to be largely ineffective against the rioters; most of the
police themselves were Greek or Italian mutamassirun, and thus had little
power against the anti-Italian Egyptians, and Egyptians in the police force were
sympathetic to the rioters.28 Fearing a reprise of the violence of the 1882 ʿUrabi
Revolt, many Italians took their security into their own hands and fired weapons
into the crowd. Dozens of Egyptians and Europeans were killed and wounded in
the skirmish, among them two injured Italian policemen.29
The Italian consulate attempted to calm the situation, and the Alexandrian
consul, Dolfini, attempted to work with the municipal government and the chief of
police, but because the most violent riots happened at night, he was powerless.
The British had a warship docked in the main port and sent a unit of marines
to the city to restore order in a quick military operation.30 Dolfini visited the
damaged Italian properties the next morning, assuaging the colony’s fears of
25. Dolfini to San Giuliano, letter, Nov. 1, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10, 1.
26. Ibid., 1.
27. Ibid., 3.
28. Grimani to San Giuliano, letter, 1910/717, Nov. 3, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10, 3.
29. Ibid., 2.
30. Ibid., 3.
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further protests, and later met with heads of the various Italian associations to
reinforce the foreign ministry’s dedication to the security of the Italian colony.31
A few days later, Grimani took the night train up from Cairo to inspect the
aftermath of the violence and personally visit the shaken community.
Grimani predicted that the riots and the Italophobia would be contained
in Alexandria and not spread south to the capital, since he felt that Alexandria
was a particularly “excitable” city,32 but Al-Muqattam reported that during the
first week of November there were several more riots in Alexandria, Mahalla,
and Cairo.33 Throughout the riots in the Canal Zone, Alexandria, and Cairo, the
foreign ministry and the Italian consulate continually emphasized the need for
the Italian community to remain calm, lay low, and not get involved in order to
maintain Italy’s benevolent image.34 Despite the previous decade’s campaign of
philo-Islamic pénétration pacifique, and contrary to the myth of deep mutamassir
integration, ethnic and proto-national lines ran deep throughout Egypt. Italy’s
attempt to gain the support of the Egyptian public failed. The Egyptian press saw
the invasion as yet another violent encroachment on Arab lands.
The secret mutamassir dissidents
During the first decade of the twentieth century a series of natural disasters
hit Italy with devastating force. In 1905 a large earthquake struck the southern
31. Dolfini to San Giuliano, see n. 25, 4.
32. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 28, 4.
33. “Muẓāharāt fī al-Maḥalla taʾayyedan lil-dawla al-ʾuthmāniyya,” Al-Muqattam, Oct. 7,
1911; “Muẓāharāt al-ʾAskandariyya,” Al-Muqattam, Nov. 4, 1911; “Muẓāharāt thāniyya fī
al-ʾAskandariyya,” Al-Muqattam, Nov. 6, 1911.
34. Grimani to C. Zervudachi C. Knosp Ci. Daira, 1941, Nov. 6, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 130/2
10.
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city of Calabria, killing hundreds, and three years later a massive quake shook
Calabria and Messina which leveled 98% of Messina, destroyed over 300
towns, and killed nearly 120,000 people.35 The international response of the
global network of Italian emigrants was enormous. Relief donations poured in
from America, Argentina, France, Egypt, and elsewhere as Italian expatriates
rallied together in support of their wounded homeland. Italian organizations
such as the SDA and the Red Cross worked in Egypt to raise funds and were
highly successful, both with the mutamassir community and with the Egyptian
government; one Ibrahim Bey Abdu made repeated donations for Italian
relief.36 The government’s strategy of creating a real global empire of emigrant
colonialists worked well when the homeland faced natural disasters.
During the first months of the invasion of Libya the Italian community in
Egypt was equally engaged and supportive of the Italian endeavor. Many in the
community made substantial donations to the Red Cross in order to support the
Italian military, but their contributions quickly became a point of contention.
Grimani requested the head of the Italian Red Cross to stop soliciting donations
in Cairo and Alexandria, notwithstanding the growing need of military medical
support in Libya, because while Egypt was nominally independent, it clearly
sided with Libya and Turkey during the expanding Italian aggression. Grimani
felt that any outward display of support towards the Italian military effort would
undermine Italy’s delicate position in Egypt—if the mutamassirun publicly
displayed any pro-Italian sentiments the colony could come under attack.37
35. Choate, 190.
36. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 45.
37. Grimani to San Giuliano, letter, 1773/669, Oct. 17, 1911, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10, 1.
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As the war continued, though, and the military campaign slowly ground
to an effective stalemate, many within the Italian community began to break
with the foreign affairs ministry and launch their own anti-Italian protests. The
leaders of this Italian dissident movement came from a surprising source—the
mutamassir elite who were initially charged with building italianità and Italian
cultural prestige in Egypt, primarily from Italian academia.
In December 1908, Egyptian University, later renamed Cairo University,
opened its doors in Cairo. Two of the members of the university’s general council
were Europeans with deep elite mutamassir roots: the French egyptologist
Gaston Maspéro and the Italian Ugo Lusena Bey, a civil servant with close
connections to the khedive, as well as one-time president of the Egyptian SDA.38
Under their direction the university hired over a dozen European Arabists, most
of whom had lived in Egypt for years. Three Italian Arabists—C. Alfonso Nallino,
Gerardo Meloni, and David Santillana—taught in the faculty of letters, while
other Italians were hired in various other departments.39 In his memoirs, Taha
Hussein remembered the lectures of Santillana with fondness, and recalled that
Nallino continued to teach despite the widespread anti-Italian sentiment.40 Like
the myriad of other programs undertaken by the Italian foreign ministry, the
underlying political purpose of using Italians to teach Islamic philosophical and
literary history to the Egyptian students was to project Italian benevolence and
philo-Islamic image.
38. Baldinetti, “Gli Italiani nella cultura egiziana, 1900–1930,” 50.
39. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 78–80.
40. Taha Hussein, The Days (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006), 280–81,
288; Baldinetti, “Gli Italiani nella cultura egiziana, 1900–1930,” 54.
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The political motivations for assisting with the fledgling Egyptian
University become even more clear in the case of Vincenzo Fago, who was hired
as the university’s librarian in 1909. While he was well-qualified for the position,
he was most likely hired because of his close friendship with San Giuliano,41
the minister of foreign affairs, who charged Fago with furthering the cultural
preparations for the Libyan invasion. As university librarian, Fago worked closely
with Prince Fuʾad and became one of his most trusted advisors and friends, while
simultaneously informing the Italian government of the affairs of the khedival
court. Fago’s wife, Clelia Lilia Golfarelli, also played an important role both in
the court and in the Italian community; she often worked with the SDA to further
Italian patriotism, and because of her husband’s status, she was one of the few
European women permitted into the khedival harem.42
The start of the invasion in the fall of 1911 stirred up trouble in the
university. The Italian faculty were all demoted and some were nearly fired.
Fago faced particular difficulty remaining employed due to a professional rivalry
with Nallino, but his friendship with Fuʾad provided him a certain measure of
protection. However, in March 1912, due to pressure from both Nallino and the
general anti-Italian sentiment at the university, Fago was fired.43
Not coincidentally, the Italian community’s attitude towards the war
shifted that same month. Rather than support the military action and rely on
the protection of the Italian consulate, as they had done during the Alexandrian
riots in November 1911, a large and vocal section of the community began to
41. Baldinetti, “Gli Italiani nella cultura egiziana, 1900–1930,” 52.
42. Ibid., 52–53.
43. Baldinetti, Orientalismo e colonialismo, 119.
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rebel against the authority of Grimani and the consulate. Italian migrants sent an
increasing number of negative telegraphs home, criticizing the war and the Cairo
consulate’s handling of the Egyptian outbursts against it.44 Italian associations
and organizations, including the SDA, the keystone of emigrant Italianization,
held secret meetings to stir up anger against the consulate. On March 18
Grimani cancelled a masquerade ball held at the Leonardo da Vinci state school
because of reports that the presidents of the various Italian associations in Cairo
would use the event as a front to organize a coalition against the consulate.45
Undeterred, the dissident community leaders rescheduled their planning meeting
for another event to be held at the khedival opera house. Grimani, under the
impression that he had stopped the movement at the masquerade, allowed
the opera event to proceed. With the tacit (and unknowing) permission of
the consulate, community leaders publicized the meeting in the local Italian
press, inviting all Italians to join in the anti-government protest.46 Following
the event at the opera house, the protestors continued to meet and protest,
causing both the Italian and British consulates great alarm. Grimani worried
about the consequences of massive Italian protests and how that would reflect
on the Italian colony in the eyes of the Egyptians, who were already fiercely
Italophobic,47 and Lord Kitchener sent a warning memo indicating his anxiety
over the deterioration of order within his Egyptian colony, advising Grimani to
44. Grimani to San Giuliano, letter, 784/268, Apr. 3, 1912, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10, 2.
45. Ibid., 1.
46. Ibid., 1–2.
47. Ibid., 2.
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prevent any meetings that “might have the effect of disturbing [the] public in
Cairo.”48
Grimani launched an investigation of the dissident movement and
discovered, to his immense surprise, that the de facto leader of the protesters
was none other than the former librarian, Vincenzo Fago, who was collaborating
closely with the president of the Cairene SDA, Sciarrino. Grimani received this
intelligence from Lasciac Bey, the famed Italian khedival architect, and regretted
that he had little reason to doubt its reliability. Fago, according to Grimani, was
an unpardonable turncoat who sought only to “create for himself a modicum of
popularity” at the expense of the unity and reputation of the Italian colony.49
Grimani interrogated Sciarrino to extract the names of other leaders of the
movement, but was unsuccessful—Sciarrino refused to name any one else in the
organization and claimed full responsibility.
Because of Fago’s close connections to the khedive and to Prince Fuʾad in
particular, Grimani was unable to approach Fago directly. In a private audience
with ʿAbbas II at the khedival court, the khedive confided to Grimani that he
would prefer that Fago be deported from Egypt, believing that he was dangerous
not only for the Italian colony, but also because he held too much sway on Fuʿad’s
judgment. However, Fuʾad joined their meeting later that day and the khedive
reversed his position completely, stating that Grimani had no right to attempt
to deport Fago. Fago’s special relationship with the prince proved to be his
redemption, and he remained in Egypt, much to Grimani’s chagrin.50
48. Kitchener to Grimani, handwritten note, Mar. 23, 1912, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10, 2.
49. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 44, 3.
50. Ibid., 4.
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Grimani was outraged by Fago’s blatant “antipatriotism” and wrote that
he felt that not only was it offensive, it was extremely dangerous for “foreigners
who are guests of this land” to engage in such covert civil disobedience.51
Grimani lamented that he found it deplorable that “Italian nationals fail to
realize their moral obligation, especially in these exceptional circumstances,
to remain united behind their country.”52 Fago’s actions may not have been
rooted in true anti-Italian, pro-Libyan sentiments, especially considering the
debacle at the Egyptian University that immediately preceded the start of
anti-Italian protests among the mutamassirun. However, even if Fago acted
simply out of spite for being fired as librarian, the fact that so many other Italians
rallied around him and his anti-government protests highlights the very real
and growing rift between the foreign ministry and the Italian mutamassirun. In
their missives, Italian officials worried not only about the subversive Fago, but
the overall malaise and discontent of the Italian community in general.53 Fago
was able to tap into a growing reserve of anti-Italian government sentiment,
spurred on by the prolonged war, which threatened the very premise of emigrant
colonialism. That the very institutions that led the dissident movement, such as
the SDA and the faculty of the Egyptian University, were the bulwarks of Italy’s
pro-mutamassir, pro-emigrant agenda reveals that the foreign ministry strategy
was not wholly successful. Italy’s manufactured consent was far from unanimous.
51. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 44, 1.
52. Grimani to Incaricato d’affari, letter, 56/1008, Apr. 12, 1912, ASDMAE AC, 130/2 10.
53. Grimani to San Giuliano, see n. 44, 2.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Prospects
Despite Italy’s legal maneuvers to avoid diplomatic embarrassment, the
thousands of francs and lire of bribes and subsidies to buy off Egyptian
newspapers, its support of Il Convito/al-Nadi, its professed philo-Islamic leanings
and support of Sufi movements, its work to improve Italian education and
inculcate Italian nationalism and patriotism, and the dozens of other tactics
aimed at casing Italy as a benevolent center of refined European culture,
disinterested in the economic subjugation of Egypt and the rest of the region,
its decade-long push for Egyptian and mutamassir consent for the invasion of
Libya appears to have been unsuccessful in the short term. Many of the leaders
of the very institutions Italy had established to encourage pro-Italian government
sentiment rebelled against the colonial military invasion of neighboring Libya.
Government correspondence reveals uneasiness and frustration with the
Egyptian colony for failing to support such a deeply patriotic goal as the direct
expansion of the Italian empire into Libya. The mutamassirun, the foreign
ministry’s courtship, were far from unanimous in their consent or support.
But was the failure to manufacture and sustain unanimous consent for the
Libyan undertaking a true failure, or merely a minor setback in Italian foreign
policy in Egypt? As discussed previously, Italy’s overall goal with the policy of
emigrant colonialism was to create an international network of Italians who felt
part of the Italian homeland; to formulate a “nation” of loyal citizens willing to
support Italy from their respective host countries. Italy was able to successfully
reap the benefits of its largely successful program. In 1914, at the onset of
World War I, the major European actors, which all had relatively extensive
imperial holdings worldwide, called up their expatriate communities to assist in
the war. While France, Britain, and Germany struggled to find willing recruits
throughout their wide empires, Italy saw the return of over 300,000 emigrant
reservists. Surprisingly, Italy was the only combatant country in Europe to gain
population during the long war of attrition.1 Unlike soldiers in the British and
German empires, these Italian reservists were not recruited or drafted—most
volunteered.2 Two years after the anti-foreign ministry protests in Cairo, Italians
in Egypt rallied to the side of their Italian homeland in the Great War. Nearly
3,000 mutamassirun volunteered to fight in the trenches, including Giuseppe
Ungaretti.3 If the Italian mutamassirun were so supportive of Italy in World War
I, why did they fail to support the Libyan invasion?
According to the sources used in this thesis, the mutamassirun failed
to understand the importance of the invasion of Libya. Government sponsored
institutions such as SDA failed to instill deep italianità in the Italian colony
and the embassy and consulates were unable to connect with the Italian
mutamassirun and build a trusting relationship. Grimani’s lament, cited
previously, summarizes the foreign ministry’s conclusions: “Italian nationals
1. Choate, 208.
2. Ibid., 210.
3. Ibid., 211.
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fail[ed] to realize their moral obligation, especially in these exceptional
circumstances, to remain united behind their country.”4 To the foreign ministry it
appeared that the fickle Italian community only stood by their homeland when the
war went well—as soon as the military struggle turned sour the colony rebelled.
Many in the foreign ministry, as is evident from the many telegrams and other
forms of correspondence, blamed the colony’s infidelity on the cosmopolitanism
of Cairo and Alexandria—a large proportion of the community had little or no
connection to Italy, and more had lost their italianità despite ongoing government
attempts to prevent integration and assimilation into Egyptian society.5
However, high-level diplomatic and parliamentary correspondence
can only go so far in explaining the lack of enduring support. The Italian
mutamassirun were hardly a homogenous sector of Egyptian or Italian society,
and thus their reaction to the colonization of Libya cannot truly be generalized.
Future research regarding the Italian colony in Egypt could be served by
an analysis of the mutamassirun through the lens of class relationships and
structures. It is plausible that the division of the mutamassirun over Libya
fell along class lines. Poorer migrant workers in the Suez Canal zone and on
the periphery of the bifurcated European cities in Cairo and Alexandria were
most likely to live among Egyptians rather than Europeans.6 The lower classes
of mutamassirun were far less isolated than their upper-class counterparts
in the heart of Ismaʿil’s Cairo or the European neighborhood of Ramla in
4. Grimani to d’affari, see n. 52.
5. Petricioli, 1.
6. Chapter 3 in Ruiz, explores the geographic domestic spaces shared by poorer
Europeans and Egyptians and supports the idea that class ideology and identity often transcended
budding notions of nationality.
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Alexandria, and were thus more likely to harbor sympathies for lower-class
Libyans subjugated by Italian colonialists.
Class identity may also explain the dissidence of the Italian academics at
Cairo University. As stated in the previous chapter, Vincenzo Fago led anti-war
demonstrations after getting fired from the university. While his anger at the
foreign ministry may have been driven simply by self-interest, self-protection,
and revenge, it is also likely that Fago and the other intellectuals in the Italian
colony were influenced by class ideology. Leftist anti-imperialist sentiment
often emerged from universities and coincided with the growth of socialism
throughout Europe. Conversely, it is likely that the more bourgeois elements of
the community tended to support the invasion, as they benefitted directly from
the investments of Banco di Roma and the other pro-italianità programs.
Given the documentation available, such class-based analysis must
unfortunately remain speculative for this thesis—it is difficult to arrive at such
conclusions by looking solely at government correspondence. Additionally,
the lack of any lasting documentation, such as books, letters, or memoirs,
from the Italian mutamassirun will make it difficult to find a clear picture of
the fragmented and diverse community. However, recent trends in modern
Egyptian social history provide a novel approach to understanding the class
relationships of the European communities in colonial Egypt. By using consular
and mixed court records, only recently made available by the Egyptian and
British governments, scholars such as Mario Ruiz, Will Hanley, Shane Minkin,
and Hanan Kholoussy have been able to uncover class ideologies and other
historiographically forgotten insights in the history of cosmopolitan colonial
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Egypt where documentation “from below” is lacking. In the same vein of these
new historians, future archival work in the mixed court and consular court
files in Cairo and London will add tremendous nuance to the topic of Italian
mutamassirun in Egypt.
For the intents of this thesis, though, by looking at the sparsely
documented reactions of the mutamassirun in concert with the heavily
documented and unexplored government correspondence during the decade
preceding the Italian invasion and colonization of Libya, it is clear that the
mutamassirun proved to be a difficult obstacle in Italy’s strategy of pénétration
pacifique. The Italian foreign ministry was largely unsuccessful in winning
over either the Egyptians or the Italian mutamassirun despite its attempts
to manufacture consent for the war among both communities, and while
it attempted to portray itself as a philo-Islamic and culturally and morally
benevolent European center, the underlying imperialist veneer of its professed
benevolence was incontrovertibly obvious and the Egyptian and emigrant
communities failed to give their full support to the colonization of Libya.
110
Archives and Manuscript Collections
ACS:PCM Archivio Centrale del Stato. Presidenza Consiglio Ministero
collection, Archivio Centrale del Stato, Roma.
ASDMAE AC Archivio Storico Diplomatico. Ambasciata al Cairo collection,
Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma.
ASMAI Archivio Storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana. Held in
ASDMAE, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma.
DDI IV Edoardo Del Vecchio, editor. I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
(1908–1914). Vol. 5/6. quarta serie (11 Dicembre 1909–29 Marzo
1911). Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Libreria dello
Stato, 2001.
Bibliography
Amicucci, Davide. “La comunità italiana in Egitto attraverso i censimenti dal 1882
al 1947.” In Tradizione e modernizzazione in Egitto: 1798-1998, edited
by Paolo Branca, 81–94. Collana storica del Centro studi per i popoli
extraeuropei dell’Università di Pavia, no. 16. Milan: F. Angeli, 2000.
Anderson, Lisa. “Ramadan al-Suwayhli: Hero of the Libyan Resistance.” Chap. 8.
In Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East, edited by Edmund
Burke, 114–28. 1st ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Angell, James B. “The Turkish Capitulations.” The American Historical Review 6,
no. 2 (Jan. 1901): 254–259.
Atti del secondo congresso degli italiani all’estero. Istituto coloniale italiano.
N. p., 1911.
Balboni, L. A. Gl’Italiani nella civiltà egiziana del secolo XIX. 3 vols. Alexandria,
Egypt: Penasson (Comitato Alessandrino della Società Dante Alighieri),
1906.
Baldinetti, Anna. “Gli Italiani nella cultura egiziana, 1900–1930.” Levante 49, no.
1–2 (2002): 43–58.
———. Orientalismo e colonialismo. Rome: Istituto per l’Oriente “C. A. Nallino”,
1997.
Beinin, Joel and Zachary Lockman. Workers on the Nile: Nationalism,
Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954. Cairo:
American University in Cairo Press, 1988.
Bigiavi, Edoardo D. Noi e l’Egitto. Livorno: San Belforte, E. C., 1911.
Bono, Salvatore. Morire per questi deserti: Lettere di soldati italiani dal fronte
libico (1911–12). Catanzaro: Abramo, 1992.
Brinton, Jasper Yeates. The Mixed Courts of Egypt. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1930.
Brown, Nathan J. “The Precarious Life and Slow Death of the Mixed Courts of
Egypt.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 25, no. 1 (Feb. 1993):
33–52.
Cannon, Byron. Politics of Law and the Courts of Nineteenth-Century Egypt. Salt
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988.
Childs, Timothy. Italo-Turkish Diplomacy and the War over Libya: 1911–1912.
Leiden: Brill, 1990.
Choate, Mark I. Emigrant Nation: The Making of Italy Abroad. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2008.
Clot-Bey, A. B. Aperçu général sur l’Egypte. 2 vols. Masson et Cie, Paris: Fortin,
1840.
Cole, Juan. Colonialism and Revolution in the Middle East: Social and Cultural
Origins of Egypt’s ʿUrabi Movement. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993.
Cresti, Federico. “Comunità proletarie italiane nell’Africa mediterranea tra XIX
secolo e periodo fascista.” Mediterranea 5 (2008): 189–214.
113
Discorsi parlamentari di Francesco Crispi. 3 vols. Rome: Tipografia della Camera
dei Deputati, 1915.
Gherson, Randolph. “The Anglo-Egyptian Question.” Middle East Journal 7, no. 4
(1953): 456–483.
Gorman, Anthony. Historians, State And Politics In Twentieth Century Egypt:
Contesting the Nation. London: Routledge, 2003.
Grange, Daniel J. L’Italie et la Méditerranée (1896–1911): Les fondements d’une
politique étrangère. 2 vols. Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 1994.
Hanley, Will. “Foreignness and Localness in Alexandria, 1880-1914.” PhD diss.,
Princeton, 2007.
Hatina, Meir. “Where East Meets West: Sufism, Cultural Rapprochement, and
Politics.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37, no. 3 (Aug.
2007): 389–409.
Hunter, F. Robert. Egypt Under the Khedives, 1805–1879: From Household
Government to Modern Bureaucracy. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1984.
Hussein, Taha. The Days. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2006.
Ibrahim, Mohebb Saad. “L’Egitto di Ungaretti.” In Tradizione e modernizzazione
in Egitto: 1798-1998, edited by Paolo Branca, 159–65. Collana storica del
Centro studi per i popoli extraeuropei dell’Università di Pavia, no. 16.
Milan: F. Angeli, 2000.
Insabato, Enrico. Al-Mudawwana al-thahabiyya. Cairo: n. p., 1912.
114
Lawson, Fred H. “Rural Revolt and Provincial Society in Egypt, 1820–1824.”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 13, no. 2 (May 1981):
131–153.
Mandelaum, Allen, editor. Selected Poems of Giuseppe Ungaretti. Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1975.
Marsot, Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid. Egypt in the Reign of Muhammed Ali. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Masters, Bruce. “The 1850 Events in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria’s
Incorporation into the Capitalist World System.” International Journal of
Middle East Studies 22, no. 1 (Feb. 1990): 3–20.
Mitchell, Timothy. Colonising Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988.
Mowat, R. C. “From Liberalism to Imperialism: The Case of Egypt 1875-1887.”
The Historical Journal 16, no. 1 (Mar. 1973): 109–124.
Petricioli, Marta. Oltre il mito: L’Egitto degli italiani (1917-1947). Torino:
Mondadori Bruno, 2007.
Porcinari, Carlo Gotti. Rapporti Italo-Arabi (1902–1930) dai documenti di Enrico
Insabato. Roma: E. S. P., 1965.
Raymond, André. Cairo: City of History. Translated by Willard Wood. Cairo:
American University in Cairo Press, 2001.
Reimer, Michael J. Colonial Bridgehead: Government and Society in Alexandria,
1807-1882. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.
115
Reimer, Michael J. “Colonial Bridgehead: Social and Spatial Change in Alexandria,
1850-1882.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 20, no. 4 (Nov.
1988): 531–53.
Rossi, Ettore. “Gl’Italiani in Egitto.” Chap. 4. In Egitto Moderno, 79–88. Roma:
Edizioni Roma, 1939.
Ruiz, Mario M. “Intimate Disputes, Illicit Violence: Gender, Law, and the State in
Colonial Egypt, 1849-1923.” PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2004.
Sammarco, Angelo. Gli Italiani in Egitto: il contributo italiano nella formazione
dell’Egitto moderno. Alexandria, Egypt: Angelo Procaccia, 1937.
Scarbel, Angelo. “Una Rivista Italo-Araba d’Inizio Secolo: an-Nadi (Il Convito).”
Oriente moderno 58 (1978): 51–67.
Schölch, Alexander. Egypt for the Egyptians!: The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt,
1878–1882. St. Anthony’s Middle East Monographs, no. 14. London: Ithaca
Press, 1981.
Solé, Robert. Birds of Passage. London: Harvill Press, 2000.
Toledano, Ehud R. “Mehmet Ali Paşa or Muhammad Ali Basha? An
Historiographic Appraisal in the Wake of a Recent Book.” Middle Eastern
Studies 21, no. 4 (Oct. 1985): 141–159.
Vatter, Sherry. “Journeymen Textile Weavers in Nineteenth-Century Damsacus:
A Collective Biography.” Chap. 5. In Struggle and Survival in the Modern
Middle East, edited by Edmund Burke, 75–90. 1st ed. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1993.
116
